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Abstract
As well recognized, healthcare information is growing exponentially and is made
more available to public. Frequent users such as medical professionals and pa-
tients are highly dependent on the web sources to get the appropriate informa-
tion promptly. However, the trustworthiness of the information on the web is
always questionable due to the fast and augmentative properties of the Internet.
Most search engines provide relevant pages to given keywords, but the results
might contain some unreliable or biased information. Consequently, a significant
challenge associated with the information explosion is to ensure effective use of
information. One way to improve the search results is by accurately identify-
ing more trustworthy data. Surprisingly, although trustworthiness of sources is
essential for a great number of daily users, not much work has been done for
healthcare information sources by far.
In this dissertation, I am proposing a new system named HealthTrust, which
automatically assesses the trustworthiness of healthcare information over the In-
ternet. In the first phase, an unsupervised clustering using graph topology, on
our collection of data is employed. The goal is to identify a relatively larger and
reliable set of trusted websites as a seed set without much human efforts. After
that, a new ranking algorithm for structure-based assessment is adopted. The
basic hypothesis is that trustworthy pages are more likely to link to trustworthy
pages. In this way, the original set of positive and negative seeds will propagate
over the Web graph. With the credibility-based discriminators, the global scor-
ing is biased towards trusted websites and away from untrusted websites. Next,
in the second phase, the content consistency between general healthcare-related
webpages and trusted sites is evaluated using information retrieval techniques to
evaluate the content-semantics of the webpage with respect to the medical top-
ics. In addition, graph modeling is employed to generate contents-based ranking
for each page based on the sentences in the seed pages. Finally, in order to
integrate the two components, an iterative approach that integrates the cred-
ibility assessments from structure-based and content-based methods to give a
final verdict - a HealthTrust score for each webpage is exploited. I demonstrated
the first attempt to integrate structure-based and content-based approaches to
automatically evaluate the credibility of online healthcare information through
HealthTrust and make fundamental contributions to both information retrieval
and healthcare informatics communities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapid growth of Web 2.0 and social networks has changed the way people seek health
information. Instead of relying on traditional media such as TV, radio and newspaper, users
now satisfy their information needs through search engines, social media (blogs, tweets, etc.)
and wikis. More than 70,000 Websites provided health information and more than 50 million
people searched health information on the Internet in 2001 [10], and these numbers have
been increased as of now. In this context, huge amount of healthcare related information
has been published through various sources: government agencies, non-profit organizations,
hospitals, clinics, pharmaceutical and insurance companies, and producers of other health
related products. Alternatively, there are huge volumes of personal websites, blogs and
tweets that introduce personal experiences and advices from patients, doctors, nurses, and
product sales. As Robinson et al. [51] defined, seeking health information is an interactive
communication between consumers, patients, professionals and computers or other mobile
devices such as smart phones. Empirical studies were conducted to assess the quality of
the information on the Web and found out the dependency of patients or consumers on the
Internet as their medical references [50, 17, 24, 23]. The results showed that the dependency
of the websites was highly related to the websites’ design or maintenance style rather than
the quality of contents.
1
1.1 Motivation
Even though in Healthcare, scientific, accurate and objective information is vital, not all
health-related content on the Internet is trustworthy. Healthcare-related government sites
such as NIH publish information that is highly scientific, but sometimes they could be
difficult for average users to understand. Non-profit organizations maintain websites with
inconsistent quality control. Hospitals, clinics, pharmaceutical and insurance companies hold
websites mostly for their business purposes, but these sites also contain general healthcare
information that might be somewhat biased. Producers of other health related products
(e.g. herbal or dietary supplements) may aggressively advertise their products and publish
information that is exaggerated in favor of their own interests. For example, Figure 1.1
apparently looks a trustworthy website containing all kinds of medical information which
is found using “heart attack” on Google search engine. However, it is most likely that
one can determine the suspiciousness of the site since they use very vague and suspicious
words such as “cure within 30 days” and contain too many advertisements in the website.
Also they provide various forums and debates but, healthcare-related blogs or forums are
often filled with information of irregular quality. In particular, with the extreme popularity
of Web 2.0 and social networking, Websites such as Facebook, Myspace and Twitter have
become very influential in users information seeking behaviors, in some cases becoming the
primary information source for many users. However, healthcare-related information in social
networking sites is highly inconsistent in quality.
Even though credible websites like the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
or the National Institute of Health (NIH) guarantee the trustworthiness of healthcare in-
formation they provide, their use of medical terminology can sometimes be hard for users
to understand. Users may tend to prefer more explanatory sites such as Wikipedia, a free
editable online encyclopedia. Furthermore, Google often returns Wikipedia pages as the
first page in its search results. Recently, a small-scale study conducted by Leithner et al.
examined the quality of the Wikipedia articles relating to Osteosarcoma [37] in comparison
2
Figure 1.1: An example of vulnerable website
to the ones available in National Cancer Institute (NCI). They observed the quality of the
Wikipedia articles to be good and more accessible than the NCI articles, but found them to
lack scientific citations.
The most popular step of seeking health information for consumers is using search engines.
The important roles of search engines in this field were discussed in [46, 31, 54]. Meric et
al. [40] used the key words, “breast cancer” on Google and examined the first 200 websites
over 100,00 English sites. They evaluated the characteristics of the websites and showed that
only 57% had the authorship in the web pages and rest of them showed partially or none.
In addition, the study confirmed that the quality of the information had no correlation with
link popularity.
We also evaluated with three different kinds of keywords using Google. Firstly, when
we put unusual search terms such as “sprain field treatment”, “squirrel bite”, out of 13 top
pages, eight are forum sites or answers from portal sites, which is mostly ‘believe or not’, one
authoritative, and four unrelated sites. Secondly, we tried sentences, for example, “I want
3
to know about Lasik surgery”, eight out of top 13 pages are from commercials to connect
specific eye doctors, there are forum or blogs and one is “unrelated”, rest of them are “news”.
The unrelated site has no information about the Lasik surgery. Also, we used general terms
like “flu treatment”, “health care medicine”, and “heart attack medicine”. The results shown
with top priorities are from insurance companies, job search, drug websites that direct you
to many other commercial sites. However, with the developments of information retrieval
technologies, search engines are well improved to design to assess the relevance as well as
the importance (or authority/popularity) of web pages. But, they are not currently using
credibility as a factor in ranking.
Apart from the quality of health information available in search engine results and
Wikipedia, we also need to consider the quality of information available in social networks.
Since more and more people are engaged in their use, their content also plays an important
role in the dissemination of health information among general consumers. Weitzman et al.
conducted a study to observe the quality and safety of diabetes-related social networks. [60]
They reported the quality to be variable, but found security and privacy of user’s personal
data to be poor. Although the study was conducted on a small scale, it is enough to show
that social networks inevitably contain suspicious healthcare information. In order to address
these issues, we need new automated approaches for a scientific and objective measurement
of trustworthiness of healthcare information.
In this way, uninformed users become very vulnerable when they search for health in-
formation on the Internet. Therefore, the quality of online healthcare information becomes
a concern due to the lack of quality control on the web. It has been observed that a very
large portion (more than half) of online healthcare information sources provide inaccurate
information [3]. For example, from a variety of types of unreviewed sources, some infor-
mation materials are provided by authors without professional training [13], some adopt “a
patronizing tone to promote a participative approach to decision making” [22, 11], and most
of the others are not reliable due to “lack of context” [21]. While an increasing number of
4
critics question the quality of online health information, limited insights has been provided.
However, there have been alternative ways to protect health information consumers. For
Instance, policy makers and government agencies (e.g. FDA) have made efforts to pre-
vent producers and retailers from distributing exaggerated or inaccurate information on
healthcare-related products. Medical Library Association [2], a non-profit organization web-
site, provides a guide to evaluate the health information on some popular websites on the
Internet [8], but all sites could not be evaluated as needed. In addition, due to the exces-
sive amount of information available on the Internet, it is extremely difficult to implement
effective surveillance mechanisms to enforce such policies. Meanwhile, they are unable to
regulate personal opinions posted on blogs and forums. On the other hand, social voting
has been very successful in many applications, e.g., retailer and product ratings, social rec-
ommendations, however, it is not suitable for judging the credibility of online healthcare
information.
With the acknowledgement of the problems in seeking health information, it is highly
expected to have a mechanism that automatically rates the trustworthiness of healthcare
information over the Internet. Consider that some search engines give a warning on suspicious
(spam or virus) Websites; likewise, it is desired if it can be delivered such an assessment
of credibility for healthcare-related contents. In order to design effective approaches to
assess the credibility and trustworthiness of online healthcare information, as well as to help
people recognize and utilize such information, firstly, a thorough understanding of healthcare
information widely distributed over the Web is needed, in particular, a study of the providers
of such information. The study includes who they are, how they are distributed, how they
are related (i.e. how they cite (endorse) their peers), etc. Graph analysis has been employed
to study various types of data, such as the Internet, online social networks, etc. In this
study, we collect online healthcare-related information through a focused crawler, and apply
statistical, graph, and link analysis methods to explore and analyze such data. Last but not
least, we design two case studies that ask users to evaluate search results from commercial
5
search engines. This preliminary work is addressed in detail in Chapter 3.
Furthermore, Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) are now
essential techniques to process text data in medical informatics. [52, 53, 28] In this study, we
propose a content-based analysis using the above techniques to analyze healthcare text data
on the web and assess its credibility. Our proposed method is inspired by an observation:
websites whose content are similar to trusted websites are also more likely to be trustworthy.
Therefore, our approach tries to identify similarities in website content in comparison to
content from known websites. To do this, we first gather healthcare related pages from the
internet using a focused crawler. We then use two methods: HMM based sentence models
to identify the trustworthiness of healthcare information and a “Bag-of-words” based Topic
Discovery method to identify topics within the sentences of those pages. We then perform
page-level and site-level classifications based on results from both these methods to identify
the trustworthy and suspicious sites. We evaluated our method on randomly chosen real
dataset and are able to achieve about 90% accuracy in identifying the trustworthiness of the
content.
1.2 HealthTrust
In this dissertation, a new system named HealthTrust, which automatically assesses the trust-
worthiness of healthcare information over the Internet, is proposed. In Phase I, structure-
based analysis is performed. In order to do that, firstly, unsupervised clustering using graph
topology on our collection of healthcare-related websites is employed. The goal is to iden-
tify a relatively larger and reliable set of trusted websites without much human efforts. Our
method starts with Affinity Propagation (AP) [27] clustering, which represents an individual
data point as a node in the network, then uses belief propagation methods that recursively
communicate with real-valued messages along edges until clusters emerge. It is expected
(and proved in a small-scale preliminary work) that some highly trustworthy websites (e.g.
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cdc.gov and fda.gov) are categorized into a few clusters, while some obviously spam pages
are also clustered. Such clusters will be easily identifiable and used as (positive and negative)
seeds in the future steps.
Based on the seed set, a biased TrustRank algorithm for link-based assessment is de-
veloped. The basic hypothesis is that trustworthy pages (originated from the seeds) are
more likely to link to trustworthy pages. This phase starts with an existing approach,
namely TrustRank [32], which essentially requires the teleport operation in PageRank to
be destined for trusted seed pages only. Other approaches will be explored to impose the
discriminator into the original PageRank algorithm, so that endorsements (in-links) from
trustworthy pages will carry higher weight, while endorsing (out-link to) untrusted pages is
a negative factor. In this way, the original set of positive and negative seeds will propagate
over the hyper-link graph. With the credibility-based discriminators, the global scoring is
biased towards trusted websites and away from untrusted websites.
Next, in Phase II, two novel approaches based on topic modeling and machine learning
techniques have been emplyed to assess the trustworthiness of the information provided in
healthcare sites by doing content-based analysis automatically. The preliminary study has
shown that term distribution similarity will not generate satisfying results since trusted and
suspicious pages use very similar terms to express opposed opinions. To tackle such problem,
two analysis methods have been done: (1) Topic discovery : we make use of TAGME to
identify salient topics in the sentences available in the healthcare websites. An analysis
of the similarity measures among the topics identified is used to decide if the information
from candidate website falls under the suspicious or trustworthy category.; and (2) HMM
analysis : apply Hidden Markov Models to model trustworthy and suspicious sentences using
an annotated training set.
Finally, in order to integrate the system, an iterative approach that integrates the credi-
bility assessments from structure-based and content-based methods to give a final verdict - a
HealthTrust score for each website will be exploited. In the iterations, strongly positive and
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strongly negative results from the structure-based approach will be used as “additional seeds”
in the content-based approach, and vise versa. The iterative approach further counteracts
the problem of limited seeds as well as the sparseness of the document space.
1.3 Contributions
HealthTrust aims to identify the trustworthiness of the healthcare related information on the
Internet automatically and provide more credible guidance to consumers. Therefore, success
of this work will bring great benefits to the general consumers. Especially, our contributions
in the content-based analysis are primarily three fold: (1) We have proposed two novel
approaches for performing content based analysis on healthcare data. (2) We have been
able to show that the Topic Modeling approach is able to perform better than the HMM
approach due to its ability to effectively capture semantic information and (3) the algorithm
for performing content analysis scales linearly making it suitable for handling big data. The
contributions of this research are below.
• We use a new algorithm to propagate trust in a two-way Web graph efficiently.
• We discover semantic topics for content analysis of healthcare information.
• We integrate the structure and content-based methods efficiently without loss of their
orthogonal properties using a new iterative algorithm expanding the positive and neg-
ative seed sets automatically.
• We have proposed two novel approaches for performing content based analysis on
healthcare data.
• We have been able to show that the Topic Modeling approach is able to perform better
than the HMM approach due to its ability to effectively capture semantic information.
• The proposed algorithm for performing content analysis scales linearly making it suit-
able for handling big data.
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The general contributions of the HealthTrust:
• Demonstrates the first attempt to integrate link-based and opinion-based approaches
to automatically evaluate the credibility of online healthcare information through
HealthTrust.
• Makes fundamental contributions to both information retrieval and healthcare infor-
matics communities.
• Builds a first milestone in trusted public healthcare information management.
• Promotes trustworthy sources that provide creditable information, in addition to help-
ing the general consumers to interpret healthcare-related information over the Internet.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. First, an overview of the related
work that motivated the development of the HealthTrust is given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3
provides the preliminary work for data collection and observation of the data. Chapter 4
shows how we select the seed sets for ranking the trustworthy sites. Chapter 5 provide the
overall analysis for the healthcare information web graph using the existing methods. The
details on our method is provided in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 shows experiment results after
performing our method on real data set. Finally, Chapter 8 summarize what we have done,
what our contributions are, and what can be done in the future.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of the two approaches that motivated the development
of the HealthTrust system. The first approach is ‘link analysis’ inspired by the observation
that websites cited by trusted websites ( e.g., CDC, NIH) are more likely to be trustworthy,
while websites citing spam sites are suspicious. The second is ‘Semantic Analysis’ inspired by
the observation that websites whose opinion is consistent with trusted websites are more likely
to be trustworthy. Followed the two approaches is a brief review of the Affinity Propagation
clustering method adopted in our HealthTrust.
2.1 Link Analysis
Link analysis is the method that extracts knowledge from a network or a graph by analyz-
ing its structure which is consisted of nodes and links. By doing so, in-depth insights are
provided intuitively that help us identify the key components or objects within the network.
The applications of link analysis are very diverse from natural sciences, such as biology, and
pharmacology to modern technology or crime analysis, such as telecommunication network
analysis, fraud detections of bank, or insurance company. In particular, the World Wide
Web, or Web, is considered as a huge graph structure due to its nature of hyperlink func-
tion in Hyper Text Markup Language(HTML) [5] like <a href =“www.google.com”>. The
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Figure 2.1: A graph of Web
hyperlinks allow web pages to link to or connect with each other. In information retrieval,
to assess the importance or authority of webpages, link analysis is employed to study the
link-based relationships between nodes. A link from node A to node B is often treated as an
endorsement or vote to support B. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a directed graph of the
Web. Each page contains one or more hyperlinks that point to other pages. The number of
incoming links is the in-degree of the node and the number of outgoing links is the out-degree
of the node. If there’s no outgoing links in the page, the node is called ‘dangling node’ or
‘terminal node’.
The analysis of the Web graph was motivated by scientific citation analysis [19, 20, 44],
which is used for a measurement of citation ranking among scientific journals, such as impact
factor. The measurement is solely dependent on counting the number of incoming links in
the network within a specific time period. The citation analysis boosted up the development
of the ranking algorithms in the Web. Ranking algorithms simply consider links of the web
graph as citations of the academic literatures. Based on the number of links, the relative
importance of the page in the web graph can be ranked. The most popular ranking algorithms
are PageRank [45] and HITS(Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search) [33]. Many other algorithms
related to a ranking problem have been proposed so far including [? 42, 18, 6]. However, the
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basic concepts of those algorithms are based on PageRank or HITS. Therefore, the focus of
this proposal is on PageRank and HITS that are reviewed in this section in detail.
2.1.1 PageRank
PageRank [45, 7] measures the probability that a page will be visited by a“tireless web
surfer”. Let G = (V ;E) be a directed graph that consists of a set of N pages (V ) and a set
of directed links between pages (E). The transition matrix T is defined as: T (u; v) = 1 if
there is an edge from page v to page u and T (u; v) = 0 otherwise. The PageRank vector R
for each page is then computed by Equation 2.1.
R(u) = α ·
∑
v:(v,u)∈E
1
ω(v)
· R(v) + (1− α) 1
N
(2.1)
where α is the decay factor for teleporting probability and ω(v) is the number of outgoing
links from v. In an iterative calculation, R(u) will eventually converge to the PageRank of
u. Figure 2.2 is a simplified example of PageRank calculation without teleporting factor. As
seen in the Figure, the rank of each page is the summation of all the scores of the incoming
links. Each incoming link score is calculated by the division of the number of outgoing links
of the page’s rank. Page C has the highest rank in the graph followed by Page D and Page E,
indicating that they are the three most important. For more detailed review, refer to [36, 4].
In spite of its popularity, PageRank has its own drawback: its negligence of the trust-
worthiness of webpages, causing unavoidable biased or untruthful pages. For example, un-
trustworthy sites can intentionally manipulate hyperlinks that point to or from good pages.
In addition, they could create many incoming links that point to another vulnerable sites
to make them important sites. Eventually, those sites cannot be filtered by PageRank algo-
rithm. To alleviate the limitation, Gyönyi et al. [32] proposed a biased PageRank algorithm,
called TrustRank, to distinguish good pages and reduce spam pages in the searched results.
TrustRank is reviewed in Section 2.1.3.
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Figure 2.2: Simple Example of PageRank Calculation
2.1.2 HITS
HITS [33] is another popular link analysis approach which divides webpages into “hubs”
and “authorities”. Different from PageRank, it assumes that authoritative pages do not
necessarily point to other authoritative pages. So they define a special node, hub, as “the
page that has links to multiple relevant authoritative pages”. By doing so, it can capture
the global nature of Web finding central pages. Thus, it is suitable for a broader search
rather than exact key word query search but also getting irrelevant. In many cases, it is
possible for one to use a specific query to search for relevant pages containing the exact
words. In HITS structure, each page can be both a hub and a authority, and the hub acts
as a pointer to meaningful pages and authority shows the meaning of the page itself. Based
on the hub-authority relationship, HITS can filter the unrelated page having large incoming
links. It implements the idea that “good hubs” point to “good authorities”, while “good
authorities” are pointed to by good hubs. Hub and authority scores are thus calculated
through an iterative approach.
Basically, given the query, all pages containing the query is gathered, and the pages are
called a root set. Next, the root set is expanded to include any pages that point to a page in
the root set and are pointed by a page in the root set. The expanded set is called a Base set.
13
Root$Set$
Base$Set$
Figure 2.3: The expansion of the root set to a base set
Figure 2.3 shows the root set expansion to get a base set. The computation is iteratively
performed for a hub score, h(x), and an authority score, a(x) for each page in the base
set using Equation 2.2 and Equation 2.3 respectively. The hub score, h(x) is calculated by
summing up the authorities of the nodes that are pointed to by the hub, and the authority
score, a(x) is the sum of the hubs that point to this authorities. We implemented HITS
algorithm, and applied it on the collected of healthcare information network. The results
are shown in Chapter 5.
h(j) =
∑
i∈B(j)
aj (2.2)
a(i) =
∑
j∈B(i)
hj (2.3)
2.1.3 TrustRank
TrustRank is a semi-automatic ranking algorithm considering the trustworthiness of web-
pages proposed by Gyönyi et al. [32]. The basic hypothesis of TrustRank is that mostly good
pages are likely to point to good pages. Figure ?? is an example of the good and bad sites
relationship. Initially, they use manually curated seed set by human experts. The seed set
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Figure 2.4: An example of a graph with good and bad sites
is chosen from the top-ranked pages produced by the inverse PageRank which is generated
using the transition matrix of the PageRank. As the name showed, the inverse PageRank
is inverted the link directions from the original link structure. The rational of the inverse
PageRank is that the more out-links the page has, the more trustworthy. Then, for next
step, TrustRank calculates the trust score using Equation 2.4. TrustRank defines the biased
factor d to implement the dampening and splitting of trust in the graph in place of the decay
factor α in PageRank. It means that the trust of a certain page will reduce if it is far away
from the good seed pages. Vector d is defined as di = 1 if page i is selected as a good page
and di = 0 if not. Then d is normalized by |d|. By doing so iteratively, it propagates the
trust scores over the web graph.
R(u) = α ·
∑
v:(v,u)∈E
1
ω(v)
· R(v) + (1− α)d (2.4)
TrustRank has several limitations; firstly human experts must involve in deciding whether
a page is good or bad and the decision might be biased and costly. Secondly, TrustRank uses
the inverse PageRank to select desirable pages as seed sets. However, the inverse PageRank
uses the out-links of the original graph that inevitably includes bad sites because some spam
sites can deceive out-links to mislead a search engine ranking system.
Unfortunately, the ranking algorithms for the search engines so far analyze the link
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structure instead of the contents of websites. As a result, consumers looking for critical health
information might get unwanted pages in the first several result pages. A worse scenario is
that the top search results are mostly unrelated sponsor’s websites, or YouTube videos. In
order to overcome the current shortcoming of the ranking algorithms, the contents of the
webpages should be analyzed to provide the consumers the degree of the trustworthiness of
the page. In this proposal, therefore, opinion-based approach is adopted along with the link-
based approach to understand the semantics of the web contents. However, before discussing
our combined approach, we give a brief discussion of the opinion-based approach in the next
section.
2.2 Affinity Propagation Clustering
Affinity Propagation clustering is proposed by Frey et. al. [27] which is a powerful unsuper-
vised machine learning method for finding an optimal set of clusters using a new concept
called exemplar. An exemplar is defined as “a data point that is nicely representative of
itself and other data points”. Basically AP algorithm considers an individual data point as
a potential exemplar in the cluster. AP algorithm performs iteratively until it detects good
exemplars efficiently and rapidly by exchanging messages between nodes from the network.
Furthermore, instead of using common similarity distance such as Euclidian distance [15],
users can define any pair-wise similarity measures. As the most distinct approach compared
to existing clustering methods such as k-means clustering [38], AP does not require the initial
selection of centers randomly, which might lead to a potential failure of clustering. Instead
it uses actual data points as potential centers and uses belief propagation [63] methods that
recursively communicate with real-valued messages until clusters are found. It is particularly
suitable for very large and sparse data. Since we want to find the representatives or most
influential domains in the web graph as our seed set, AP is an appropriate method to achieve
our goal.
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We briefly explain the algorithm of the AP clustering here. First of all, the algorithm
constructs a similarity matrix to measure the affinities between nodes. The similarity be-
tween two data points, say S(A,B), shows how well the node B represents node A [41]. The
optimal exemplars are chosen by the Equation 2.5. The net similarity S(c) is calculated by
summing up all similarities of data points to its exemplar c and is maximized to identify the
optimal exemplars.
S(c) =
N∑
i=1
s(i, ci) + ∆ (2.5)
where ∆ is a dampen function to avoid oscillations of the algorithm. However, instead
of using initial number of clusters, AP assigns a priori knowledge, P , that is the preference
value for each node showing the goodness of the node as an exemplar. The preference P can
be used as a control parameter; if P is big, it is likely to find more exemplars. Figure 2.5 is
a face clustering example using AP clustering by Frey et. al.
2.3 Sentence Modeling
Sentence modeling is a challenging problem in Natural Language Processing. NLP is a broad
area dealing with human-computer interaction problems using machine learning (ML), sta-
tistical inference, information retrieval (IR), automatic summarization, part-of-speech(POS)
tagging, sentiment analysis, topic modeling and so on. Recently, NLP is being actively
adopted in many medical research as well as healthcare informatics area [53, 28]. It is nat-
ural that the majority of data format of NLP is written text. Therefore, parsing is the
important process of the text information to understand human languages as input data.
In particular, since parsing can be done without complete understanding of language, it is
prerequisite procedure for most NLP. One of the parsing methods is called ‘part-of-speech
tagging’ which puts a label to each word with appropriate part of speech in a sentence such
as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’.
17
Figure 2.5: Face clustering [27]
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2.3.1 POS Tagging
POS tagging is the process of tagging in English sentences. Originally, linguists made words
of a language into several classes syntactically and labeled them as ‘nouns’, ‘verb’ and ‘ad-
jectives’, and they are considered as parts of speech. Parsing techniques were pioneered from
the two big corpus projects, Brown corpus [26] and the Penn Treebank project [39]. The
Penn Treebank corpus contains over 4.5 million words of American English and is widely
used as a reference tagging. Table 2.6 shows the tag set from the Penn Treebank corpus.
Due to its huge size of data in Penn Treebank project, there were two steps in tagging all
corpus; The first step was an automatic method that uses computer algorithm, and the sec-
ond step required human annotators to correct the automatic task since language naturally
contains ambiguity and inaccuracy. However, it is really laborious for human to do the cor-
rection process for tagging. In order to avoid the manual tasks, many ML techniques are
adopted such as Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [35], Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [30],
or Maximum-Entropy classifier [49, 58]. The detailed discussion of the methods is out of
scope for this proposal, however, recent taggers give good results over 97% [57].
Although POS-tagging is the required process of analyze the textual information, it has
fundamental drawbacks. First, POS tagging is syntactic analysis, hence, it is not enough to
understand the meaning of the context. It causes ambiguity due to the complex nature of
a language. An example of ambiguous cases in POS tagging is given in Figure 2.7. In the
example, in the first figure, training is used as the main verb, and in the second and third
figures, the main verb is is. To reduce the ambiguity, further analysis must be followed for
understanding the text clearly as the context. Secondly, it produces same tagging results even
though the text has different semantics. For example, the two sentences; ‘the supplement
works good’ and ‘the supplement works bad’ have the opposite meaning, but the POS tagger
gives the same results, such as NP-V-ADJ. The problem is due to two different adjectives,
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Therefore, after POS tagging, semantic analysis is inevitable. In the next
section, we review sentiment analysis as one of the semantic analysis methods.
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The	  Penn	  Treebank	  POS	  tagset	  
1.	   CC	   Coordina+ng	  conjunc+on	   25	   TO	   to	  
2.	   CD	   Cardinal	  number	   26.	   UH	   Interjec+on	  
3.	   DT	   Determiner	   27.	   VB	   Base	  form	  Verb	  
4.	   EX	   Existen+al	  there	   28.	   VBD	   Past	  tense	  Verb	  
5.	   FW	   Foreign	  word	   29.	   VBG	   Gerund/present	  par+ciple	  Verb	  
6.	   IN	   Preposi+on	   30.	   VBN	   Past	  par+ciple	  Verb	  
7.	   JJ	   Adjec+ve	   31.	   VBP	   Non-­‐3rd	  ps.	  Sing.	  Present	  Verb	  
8.	   JJR	   Compara+ve	  Adjec+ve	   32.	   VBZ	   3rd	  ps.	  Sing.	  Present	  Verb	  
9.	   JJS	   Superla+ve	  Adjec+ve	   33.	   WDT	   Wh-­‐determiner	  
10.	   LS	   List	  item	  marker	   34.	   WP	   Wh-­‐pronoun	  
11.	   MD	   Modal	   35.	   WP$	   Possessive	  wh-­‐pronoun	  
12.	   NN	   Singular	  or	  mass	  Noun	   36.	   WRB	   Wh-­‐adverb	  
13.	   NNS	   Plural	  Noun	   37.	   #	   Pound	  sign	  
14.	   NNP	   Singular	  Proper	  noun	   38.	   $	   Dollar	  sign	  
15.	   NNPS	   Plural	  Proper	  noun	   39.	   .	   Sentence-­‐final	  punctua+on	  
16.	   PDT	   Predeterminer	   40.	   ,	   Comma	  
17.	   POS	   Possessive	  ending	   41.	   :	   Semi-­‐Colon	  
18.	   PRP	   Personal	  Pronoun	   42.	   (	   Led	  bracket	  character	  
19.	   PP$	   Possessive	  Pronoun	   43.	   )	   Right	  bracket	  character	  
20.	   RB	   Adverb	   44.	   “	   Straight	  double	  quote	  
21.	   RBR	   Compara+ve	  Adverb	   45.	   ‘	   Led	  open	  single	  quote	  
22.	   RBS	   Superla+ve	  Adverb	   46.	   “	   Led	  open	  double	  quote	  
23.	   RP	   Par+cle	   47.	   ‘	   Right	  close	  single	  quote	  
24.	   SYM	   Symbol	   48.	   “	   Right	  close	  double	  quote	  
Figure 2.6: The Penn Treebank POS tagset
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Figure 2.7: Ambiguous POS tagging
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2.3.2 Hidden Markov Model Analysis
We used two approaches for our content-based analysis on healthcare data; Hidden Markov
Model [48] and TAGME. [25]
2.3.3 Hidden Markov Model
A Hidden Markov model (HMM) is a statistical model in which the system being modeled
is assumed to be a Markov process with hidden states. Primarily, HMMs have been used to
model sequence data like speech utterances in speech recognition. [47] They have also been
used in Part-of-Speech tagging [14] and Named Entity Recognition [64] tasks. The success of
HMMs in identifying patterns in sequential data has motivated us to explore the possibility
of using HMM for content-based analysis. In general, a HMM can be defined using the
following parameters:
Notation and definition
N : Number of states in the HMM
M : Number of observation symbols in the HMM
A = [aij]: N by N state transition probability matrix
B = bj (m): N by M observation probability matrix
Π = [πi]: N by 1 initial state probability vector
An HMM is used to model a sequence with hidden states that represent the latent
characteristics of the pattern that we are trying to model, which however emit symbols
or observations that are visible. The outputs of the hidden states are observable and are
represented as probabilistic functions of the state. In case of sentence modeling, the hidden
states would represent the characteristics of a sentence, while the words forming the sentence
would represent the visible observations. HMM is a supervised learning method where a
training set is used to train the model. The Baum Welch algorithm is used for this and it
learns the transition and observation probabilities of the HMM. Once trained, the HMM can
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then be used for computing the probability of a sentence belonging to given model using the
Forward-Backward algorithm or can be used to predict the possible hidden state sequence
that could have generated a given sequence of observations using the Viterbi algorithm.
2.4 Topic Modeling
2.4.1 Short-Text Tagging
Traditional topic modeling methods use probabilistic approaches based on “bag-of-words”
model. [55] However, the “bag-of-words” approach is solely based on the frequency of terms
in a document; therefore it is hard to capture the semantics of the text. In order to overcome
the problem, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) [16], Explicit Semantic Analysis (ESA) [29]
or Knowledgebase approaches [62] have been proposed. Recently, with the rapid growth of
Wikipedia’s knowledgebase and its link structure connecting the related concepts efficiently,
several ESA based approaches using Wikipedia have been studied. [59, 56, 12] One of the
ESA methods is TAGME, which is a web application tool for identifying underlying topics
in short text fragments using Wikipedia and its link structure proposed by Ferragina and
Scaiella (http://tagme.di.unipi.it/) [25]. They improved their method based on the studies
of Kulkarni et al. and Cucerzan to deal with annotating very short texts or fragments such
as tweets or news feed items on-the-fly. [34, 12]
2.4.1.1 TAGME
A systematic way of topic identification is using TAGME proposed by Ferragina and
Scaiella [25]. TAGME is a tool to identify topics or short phrases in an unstructured or
short text fragments. The topics in TAGME are identified from the hyperlinked texts in
all the Wikipedia pages discarding ambiguous pages, list pages and redirect pages. It tries
to find hypertext words in Wikipedia from the text and connect to them to a high related
corresponding Wikipedia page. TAGME allows us to identify the context-based topics by
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understanding the text semantically. If we directly use terms from MedlinePlus dictionary,
we can only capture the exact matching words in the sentence. Then if the sentence contains
similar meaning but different words, we might miss the semantics in the text. However, if
we use TAGME, we can obtain more semantically related topics in the text and find more
accurate similarity between sentences. Table 2.1 shows an example of using TAGME. The
sample sentence is the detailed information of term ‘weight control’ from MedlinPlus. As
shown in the table, we find more related topics. Therefore, this tool is suitable to adopt for
our topic identification method.
Table 2.1: Identifying topics using TAGME
Sentence
“Eating too much or not being physically active enough
will make you overweight. To maintain your weight, the
calories you eat must equal the energy you burn. To lose
weight, you must use more calories than you eat.”
Tagged Text
“Eating too much or not being physically active
enough will make you overweight . To maintain your
weight, the calories you eat must equal the energy you
burn . To lose weight , you must use more calories
than you eat.”
Topics
Eating Physical exercise Overweight Calorie
Food energy Burn Weight loss
Given the set of anchor texts A(X) identified from a block of text X, the score for a
particular sense px for the anchor text x to be associated with the page p is determined
through a vote of all other anchor texts y which are in support of the annotation x
link−−→ p.
Since the anchor text y can also have many senses, the vote is computed as the average
relatedness for each sense py of the anchor y in relation to the sense px. Since not all
senses of y have the same statistical significance, the contribution of py is weighted using its
commonness or prior probability Pr(py | y). Thus the voting formula is defined as:
votey(px) =
∑
py∈G(y) rel(py, px)Pr(py | y)
| G(y) |
(2.6)
where rel(a, b) is a measure of relatedness between two pages a and b based on the overlap
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between their in-linking pages in Wikipedia. The relatedness score makes sure that only the
senses py that are related to px affect the voting measure. The final score that defines the
goodness of the annotation x
link−−→ p is obtained by the sum of the votes of all other possible
anchors y in the text T . The set of candidate anchors identified from the disambiguation
phase are then passed through a pruning phase to discard possibly meaningless anchors.
These bad anchors are identified based on the link probability of an anchor and the coher-
ence of its candidate annotation which is computed as the average relatedness between the
candidate sense of an anchor and the candidate senses for all other anchors in the given text.
Only anchors with high link probability or whose assigned sense is coherent with the senses
to other anchors are retained.
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Chapter 3
Data Collection and Analysis
3.1 Data Collection
The first phase of the data analysis is to collect information about healthcare from the
Internet for our analysis. First, we implemented a crawler in Python to download pages from
the Web. The data was collected using a standard snowball approach, which follows the links
in crawled pages to find new candidate pages. The crawl was done in parallel to maximize
the use of resources. The initial seeds are sites of varying apparent quality chosen from the
first few pages of arbitrary health-related Google searches. The seeds include government
sites (e.g. nih.gov), university medical websites, hospitals, herbal remedy centers, etc. The
seeds are chosen with an emphasis on diversity so that the crawl would quickly cover a wide
range of sites, including both trustworthy and suspicious ones.
An early termination mechanism is enforced: a few initial pages crawled in a new domain
are evaluated with a heuristic, which is based on a weighted set of approximately 150 health-
related keywords. The heuristic is based on a weighted term frequency measurement, with
words and phrases very roughly weighted based on their typical usage. For instance, “blood”
is weighted low while “Blood pressure” carries a higher weight. We stop crawling a site if it
fails the test. Although we do not further crawl the domain, we still keep existing and future
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links into the domain. Early termination is designed to keep the crawl on pages somewhat
related to healthcare (regardless of quality). Domains failing this test are very unlikely to
contain healthcare-related information, hence they are not crawled further. For instance,
many websites contain a link to adobe.com, which directs users to download Adobe Reader
or Flash Player. In this case, we do not want to further crawl the entire Adobe site. In
practice, our approach selects a number of sites only tangentially related to healthcare, but
also serves to both allow healthcare sites to be crawled, and to reject the majority of the
irrelevant sites.
With the crawler, we have collected 316 thousand (316K) webpages from 39831 domains,
with 3.4 million links between webpages. We further group webpages from the same domain
(e.g. cdc.gov, nih.gov, who.int), and model the crawled network as a directed labeled graph.
In the graph, each node represents a domain (which contains all the pages from the
domain), and each edge represents links between domains. An edge is labeled as the total
number of links from the starting domain into the ending domain. In the generalized graph,
the average number of links for a domain is 84.1. The maximum number of incoming links
to a domain is 185,538, while the maximum number of outgoing links is 190,361.
For each link from site A to site B, if there also exists a link from B to A, we call them a
pair of reciprocal links. The collected graph appears to be highly asymmetric – the reciprocal
ratio is only 0.00955.
3.2 Link Distribution
First, we study the links between websites. In the Internet, a link from site A to site B
is often regarded as an endorsement made by A in support of B, which is similar to the
citation relationships in bibliography analysis. Figure 3.1 (a) shows the top 25 sites ranked
by outgoing links and their corresponding incoming links; Figure 3.1 (b) shows the top 25
sites ranked by incoming links. We can see that healthcare-related information is not only
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Figure 3.1: (a) Top 25 sites ranked by outgoing links; (b) Top 25 sites ranked by incoming
links.
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provided by professional websites. Rather, large amount of such information is published
on general content providers (e.g. aol.com); or user experiences from social networking sites
(e.g. twitter.com, blogger.com). We can also see that outgoing and incoming links are not
symmetric: most of the sites ranked high in outgoing links does not have a large number
of incoming links, i.e. the most active sites are not the most popular sites. As expected,
health-related government agencies and large content providers rank higher in in 3.1 (b).
This is consistent with users’ perceptions of the most authoritative sites. Meanwhile, we
have not observed strong link reciprocity (reciprocal ratio: 0.0096). In our data, site A
linking to site B is very unlikely to result in site B linking back to site A. This is consistent
with the measurements on the general web, but quite different from observations in online
social networks.
We use snowball crawling to collect data - we follow links from crawled pages to access
new pages. Because of this, it is natural that most of the sites post more outgoing links than
incoming links. For a crawled site, we have identified all of its outgoing links, however, we
only identified incoming links from other crawled sites, but not the entire web. We have also
recorded a large number of terminal sites that we stopped following their outgoing links. This
bias exists in all approaches using snowball crawling, since all known crawlers cover only a
small portion of the Web (Note that this bias is not significant in social network analysis: due
to strong link reciprocity, incoming links to a node mostly come from its neighborhood, and
thus are easily collected through snowball crawling.). However, we can see from Figure 3.1
(b) that the top government agencies have many more incoming links than outgoing links,
which means that their authoritativeness is widely acknowledged by other healthcare related
sites (since we only crawled healthcare related sites), and their popularity surpasses their
activeness.
Next, we study the overall distribution of links. Figure 3.2 shows the histogram of the
number of outgoing links for each node. We can see a power-law distribution: a few nodes
have a very large number of outgoing links (i.e. hubs); a moderate number of nodes have
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of out-going links.
α D
In-link 1.52 0.0263
Out-link 2.56 0.0986
Table 3.1: Power-law coefficient estimates (α) and K-S test metrics (D) for incoming and
outgoing links.
a moderate number of outgoing links; and a very large number of nodes have very few
outgoing links. This appears to be consistent with the measurements over the general Web,
as well as various social networking graphs. To confirm this observation, we further test the
graph structure of using the method proposed in [9]. The method uses maximum-likelihood
estimation and Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit metric to calculate the best power-law
fit. We plot the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) in Figure 3.3, and
find that the distribution of outgoing links and incoming links both follow the power-law,
which also satisfy scale-free network property. The power-law coefficient estimates (α) and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test metrics (D) for both distributions are shown in Table 3.1.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: Log-log plot of complementary cumulative distribution functions for: (a) incom-
ing links; (b)outgoing links.
3.3 Domain Relationships
As we have addressed in 1, for online healthcare information, the credibility of information
and the trustworthiness of the information sources are very important but relatively difficult
to measure. A very coarse but generally accepted understanding is that .gov sites carry
relatively scientific and reliable information, while the credibility of .com sites are somewhat
mixed. Therefore, to further understand the link distribution of healthcare information
providers on the Web, we employ a summarization approach to categorize our graph based
on top domains: (1) .gov is restricted to government entities, and this restriction is enforced.
(2) .edu is designed for post-secondary institutions and organizations, and this restriction
has been enforced since 2001. (3). .com is designed for commercial use, and is publicly
available. On the other hand, although .net was intended for network-related organizations
(e.g. ISPs), this has never been enforced, and .net is now treated as an alternate to .com.
Hence, we merge .com and .net sites. (4) .org is designed for non-profit or non-commercial
organizations, but this restriction has also never been enforced. In practice, it is primarily
used by the intended consumers, but it still used by a diverse group of organizations. (5) we
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Domain Sites Pages Internal Links
.com 25852 177437 28202
.org 7904 43921 3778
.gov 516 53429 1566
.edu 613 23450 330
others 4946 17890 1016
Table 3.2: Node and link distribution among top-level domains.
group all other top domains into the last category.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of domains, pages, and internal links (i.e. links starting
and ending in the top-level domain) in each category. Note that we did not include links
starting and ending in the same sites (e.g. from a page in hhs.gov to another page in
hhs.gov). Table3.3 further presents the statistics for each category. The link density is a
global measure measurement, which is defined as the proportion of existing links over total
number of links possible in the (sub)graph. To further measure the tightness of connections
in a local neighborhood, we measure the average clustering coefficient in each category. The
clustering coefficient of a node with N neighbors is defined as “the number of directed links
that exit between the node’s N neighbors, divided by the number of possible directed links
that could exist between the node’s neighbors (i.e. N×(N−1))”. We calculate the clustering
coefficient of a domain by the average clustering coefficient of all nodes in the domain.
From the table, we can see that, although .com contains the greatest number of pages
and links, the nodes in this domain are not as inter-connected as other top-level domains.
The link density and clustering coefficient are both low. However, density and clustering
coefficient from the .gov and .edu domain are the highest. This is partly due to the early
termination mechanism in crawling: many of the .com and .org sites are terminals (i.e. non-
health-related sites that we do not further crawl), hence they do not further contribute to
links.
Furthermore, we study the distribution of outgoing and incoming links by domain. Fig-
ure 3.4 demonstrates the distribution of outgoing links from each top-level domain to all
categories. Please note that the number of links in each pie piece is normalized by the num-
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Domain Link Density Clustering Coefficient
.com 0.08E-03 0.39E-03
.org 0.12E-03 1.01E-03
.gov 11.7E-03 8.44E-03
.edu 1.75E-03 1.17E-03
others 0.08E-03 0.44E-03
Table 3.3: Statistics for top-level domains.
ber of pages in the destination domain. Therefore, the pie-chart represents the distribution
of outgoing links with respect to the size of the destination domain. Figure 3.5 shows the
distribution of incoming links to each top domain from all categories, normalized by the
size of the origination domain. From the figure, we can see that .org is the most popular
destination, while .com appears to be unfavorable except by itself. In fact, all to-level do-
mains post significant numbers of links to .com, however, since .com is the largest category,
the proportions become small. Unexpectedly, .gov is not a popular destination either. With
further analysis of the data, we found that government sites are relatively large (on average),
but many of the external sites only have a link to the front page.
To highlight the primary contributors from/to each domain, we exclude all minor pieces
(< 10%) from the pie chart, and redraw the remaining in Figure 3.6 (note that we eliminated
“others” category). From the figure, we can see that the link between .gov and .com are
quite weak – the are on the two ends of the spectrum. Meanwhile, due to the fact that
.org domain is relatively diversified (contains both highly trustable organizations, as well as
highly suspicious personal or small-size commercial users), it is somewhat balanced in terms
of link distribution. .edu is similar to .org. We expected .edu to show stronger association
to .gov, however, the observation disproved our prediction.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of outgoing links by domain.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of incoming links by domain.
Figure 3.6: Outgoing and incoming links.
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3.4 User study
3.4.1 Experiment I: Search
In the first user study, we designed 10 queries related to healthcare, and asked experts to
judge the trustworthiness of the top 20 results returned from a commercial search engine:
Google. The queries are:
• “stomach flu treatment”
• “chiropractic massage therapy”
• “emergency treatment”
• “EKG” (electrocardogram)
• “cushing’s syndrome”
• “menopause”
• “exercise muscle”
• “diet weight loss”
• “sprain treatment”
• “norovirus”
The goal is to study the reliability of the search engine, especially if it returns credible
results. Overall, 51% of the sites are labeled as “credible” by the users, while 45% of the
sites are found to be “suspicious”, and the other sites (4%) are irrelevant or inaccessible. A
breakdown of the labels is shown in Figure 3.7.
As we can see from the figure, for every query, there are at least a few suspicious sites
returned by the search engine. Again, it proves that search engines do not use trustworthiness
in their scoring mechanism. The mixed results could be very confusing to the users. Although
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Figure 3.7: Credibility of healthcare-related search results judged by users.
our experts are capable of distinguishing trustworthy and untrustworthy sites, it could be a
difficult task for regular users, especially consider that the Internet is currently used by a
very diverse population. To confirm this, we have designed another user study.
3.4.2 Experiment 2: Search Result
In this experiment, we search for “heart attack medicine” using Google, one of the top 10
results is a particularly suspicious webpage. It contains 45 sponsored advertisements, most
of which sells herbal or dietary supplements that are not FDA approved. FDA evaluation
and approval is not required for such products, however, only a few of these websites prop-
erly contain the FDA-required disclaimer that such products “are not intended to treat,
diagnose, or cure any disease.” In a user-based evaluation, we have asked 22 participants
(undergraduate and graduate students, faculty members) to judge the trustworthiness of the
webpage. Among the 22 responses, only one of them thinks that the webpage is trustworthy
and the content is scientific and authoritative. Meanwhile, a large portion of the users (68%)
think that the webpage contains both trustworthy and false contents, or cannot determine
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the trustworthiness of the webpage. On average, it takes 188 seconds for a user to make the
verdict. It appears that the webpage – although ranked highly by Google – confused many
of the participants. They took a long time to determine the trustworthiness of the webpage,
and many of them still could not make a judgment.
Web users are highly diverse - not all of them have the expertise to judge the correctness
and trustworthiness of all of such websites. In our experiment, all participants are highly
educated with various backgrounds (CS, EE, Biology and Chemistry). However, many of
them still had difficulty with the task. Meanwhile, when participants are introduced to
a potentially dangerous combination of information that appears to be correct together
with information that is extremely suspicious, most of them found it difficult to judge the
credibility of the information source.
The results of the user studies demonstrates the very mixed quality and credibility of on-
line healthcare information. Many people now use the Internet as their primary information
source. However, our results show that users are very vulnerable when they seek for health
advice and information over the Internet.
38
Chapter 4
Seed Set Selection
Seed selection is very critical in ranking algorithm to assess the trustworthiness of the web-
pages. TrustRank proposed a Inverse PageRank to identify the initial seed set. However, it
needs human effort to curate whether the seed set is trustworthy or not. In this proposal,
we use automatic seed set selection method using Affinity Propagation clustering method to
exclude manual work. Section 4.1 show the Inverse PageRank process for TrustRank and
followed section describes the seed selection method for our proposed system, HealthTrust.
4.1 Selecting seeds from Inverse PageRank
As described inInver PageRank in Chapter 2 is taking opposite direction of the link structure
of the Web graph. Since the behind logic of the PageRank is that the important sites have
more incoming links than relatively unimportant sites, Inverse PageRank finds the important
site from the inverse structure which has more outgoing links. We construct the inverse web
graph and perform the PageRank with the link structure. Table 4.1 is the Top 15 seeds
from the Inverse PageRank. As seen in the table, ‘healthcentral.com’ and ‘hon.ch’ are the
most popular websites among healthcare related websites on the Internet. However, we know
that popularity does not always mean the trustworthiness as we mentioned in Chapter 1.
Furthermore, several websites such as ‘blogspot.com’, technorati.com’ and ’apple.com’ are
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not trustworthy. Therefore the manual curating process is inevitable for selecting seed set
in TrustRank process.
Table 4.1: TrustRank Seed Set
Domain Rank
healthcentral.com 0.0645171
hon.ch 0.0501275
blogspot.com 0.0297561
childrenwithdiabetes.com 0.0174915
mendosa.com 0.0170831
healthonnet.org 0.0166101
netwellness.org 0.0164902
cdc.gov 0.0163779
diabetesmonitor.com 0.0144608
nih.gov 0.0143085
technorati.com 0.0114687
healthscout.com 0.00989544
ic-network.com 0.00947256
apple.com 0.00932392
familydoctor.org 0.00897219
4.2 Selecting seeds from AP Clustering
As described in 2, AP clustering finds exemplars among nodes and propagates the affinity to
form optimal clusters in the network using similarity measure. Since the similarity measure
is not necessarily to be an Euclidean distance and symmetric, we have tested two similarity
measure in HealthTrust. Also we have changed the preference values for each case to get
optimal clusters. The preference is a priori knowledge of how good the node is as a center,
therefore, in our method, we have used two different cases as preferences. However, if the
value of preference is zero, we have replaced it with 0.1 and 0.01 respectively, considering
that the node might have a link from or to some other nodes from web network. We have
defined the similarities and preferences as below.
Similarity :S(i, j)
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• Asymmetric similarity: the number of links from node i to node j.
• Symmetric similarity: sum of the number of links from both directions, i.e. S(i, j) =
S(j, i).
Preference :P (i)
• The number of domains that point to node i.
• The average number of links between other nodes.
Since the AP algorithm tries to find the maximum net similarity, we have chosen the
Asym-p01-no-terminal-node to consider for our seed sets. However, the symmetric cases get
more clusters and the number of elements are much bigger than the asymmetric cases. Thus,
we have discarded the results from symmetric cases. In addition, when we have used the
number of domains as a preference value, we have found more optimal clusters. We would
like to see the effect of the dangling nodes, we have evaluated the case that excludes them.
We found the optimal clustering result with maximum similarity in the case; Asymmetric
similarity measure and the number of domain preference without terminal nodes. The results
are shown below in Table 4.2 excluding the other cases. Table 4.3 shows the examples of
cluster we have found and the elements of NIH cluster is given in Table 4.4.
Ranking algorithm using seed sets is very sensitive to selecting proper seed sets. We
tested modified TrustRank with manually selected trustworthy sites such as “nih.gov” to
see how many trustworthy sites can be ranked within top 20. The results are shown in
Figure 4.1. It is clear that the more reliable sites are included, the more information sites
are from authoritative sites. However, AP clustering also gives us many clusters and hubs
containing small number of elements. Due to the nature of Web graph, many websites
just form its own cluster with an element which makes a lot of isolated clusters from the
clustering. Even among the authoritative sites, they are divided into different clusters. To
address this issue, we need a better selection method for seed sets.
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Table 4.2: AP clustering Results
Similarity
Type
Preference Net similarity
Number of
Clusters
(size>=2)
Number of
Clusters
(size>=3)
Number of
Clusters
(size>=5)
Asym-p0 domain 1.6537e+ 006 176 24 11
Asym-p01 domain 1.6569e+ 006 177 25 12
Asym-p001 domain 1.654e+ 006 176 25 12
Asym-p0 link 1.6419e+ 006 223 28 12
Asym-p01 link 1.6419e+ 006 222 28 12
Asym-p0-
no-terminal-
node
domain 1.6537e+ 006 171 24 10
Asym-p01-
no-terminal-
node
domain 1.6569e+ 006 172 24 10
Asym-p001-
no-terminal-
node
domain 1.654e+ 006 170 25 10
Asym-p0-
no-terminal-
node
link 1.6419e+ 006 204 26 10
Asym-p001-
no-terminal-
node
link 1.6419e+ 006 205 26 10
Sym domain 3.2879e+ 006 233 201 182
Sym-no-
terminal-
node
domain 3.2879e+ 006 215 192 168
Table 4.3: Example of clusters
Center site Number of elements in the cluster
adobe.com 7
hon.ch 14
nih.gov 9
twitter.com 12
usa.gov 5
healthcentral.com 15
facebook.com 6
whitehouse.gov 7
feedburner.com 5
google.com 15
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Table 4.4: ‘hhs.gov’ cluster
Hub domain Elements in the cluster
hhs.gov (U.S.
Department Health &
Service)
ahrq.gov
cdc.gov
fda.gov
flu.gov
insurekidsnow.gov
cms.gov
foodsafety.gov
health.gov
hrsa.gov
medicare.gov
womenshealth.gov
pandemicflu.gov
samhsa.gov
childwelfare.gov
phe.gov
MT# MT# MT#PR#
(1#seed)# (2#seed)# (3#seed)#
GOV#
ORG#
COM#
Figure 4.1: Top 20 with different number of seeds
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Chapter 5
Analysis for the Healthcare
Information Web
We have experimented our data set for three ranking algorithms, PageRank, HITS, and
TrustRank respectively. The results show that ranking algorithms are not enough to identify
the trustworthy websites as a sole method. Additionally, we evaluated the term frequency of
the randomly chosen websites from credible and suspicious websites. The results are shown
in section 5.2.
5.1 Ranking Algorithms
5.1.1 PageRank
We applied PageRank on the healthcare information network that we collected. Results are
shown in Table 5.1. As we can see, the results are very mixed. Many non-health related
websites are ranked very high, since they are frequently pointed-to by healthcare related
websites. Meanwhile, social networking sites, such as Twitter, Facebook and Blogspot are
ranked very high − this may introduce a potential risk that personal experiences or advices
from social networking sites be ranked high in a healthcare-related search. When we further
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Rank Name PageRank Score
1 healthcentral.com 0.0032786
2 twitter.com 0.0030572
3 facebook.com 0.0026880
4 google.com 0.0023624
5 thefreedictionary.com 0.0021416
6 adobe.com 0.0020395
7 *hon.ch 0.0014591
8 youtube.com 0.0014153
9 *cdc.gov 0.0012058
10 *nih.gov 0.0012026
11 farlex.com 0.0011012
12 shopwishlist.com 0.0010909
13 blogspot.com 0.0009334
14 thehealthcentralnetwork.com 0.0008741
15 wikipedia.org 0.0008634
16 *hhs.gov 0.0008625
17 usa.gov 0.0008506
18 cafepress.com 0.0007953
19 thefreelibrary.com 0.0007692
20 definition-of.com 0.0007687
Table 5.1: Top 15 PageRank results
look into our data, we found that we do have a large number of healthcare-related pages
from blog space, which give personal advices, and refer to a mixture of reliable and suspi-
cious sites. Meanwhile, some highly credible government sites and non-profit noncommercial
organization sites are also ranked very high.
5.1.2 HITS
Another popular link analysis approach is HITS [? ] described in Chapter 2, which divides
webpages into “hubs” (pages with many outgoing links) and “authorities” (pages with many
incoming links). It is based upon the idea that “good hubs” point to “good authorities”,
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Rank Authority Name Rank Hub Name
1 twitter.com 1 blogspot.com
2 google.com 2 cdc.gov
3 youtube.com 3 wikipedia.org
4 facebook.com 4 nih.gov
5 nih.gov 5 usda.gov
6 wikipedia.org 6 washingtonpost.com
7 nytimes.com 7 typepad.com
8 yahoo.com 8 nytimes.com
9 adobe.com 9 clinicaltrials.gov
10 apple.com 10 usatoday.com
11 blogspot.com 11 cnn.com
12 cnn.com 12 google.com
13 amazon.com 13 twitter.com
14 cdc.gov 14 go.com
15 fda.gov 15 businessweek.com
16 flickr.com 16 webmd.com
17 washingtonpost.com 17 yahoo.com
18 wordpress.com 18 harvard.edu
19 about.com 19 ama-assn.org
20 go.com 20 youtube.com
Table 5.2: Sites with top authority and top hub scores.
while “good authorities” are pointed to by “good hubs”. Hub and authority scores are thus
calculated through an iterative approach.
We implemented the HITS algorithm, and applied it on the collected of healthcare in-
formation network. Results are shown in Table 5.2. Again, the result is very mixed. In
particular, the top 4 authorities are all social networking and search engines – many sites
have a link to these sites, pointing to a YouTube video, a Facebook group, or a user on
twitter. On the other hand, the most reliable healthcare sites such as nih.gov and cdc.gov
are also ranked highly, which correctly represents their authoritative status.
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Table 5.3: Top 15 TrustRank results
Name Score
healthcentral.com 0.141919
hon.ch 0.140551
twitter.com 0.006129
facebook.com 0.005049
adobe.com 0.004185
google.com 0.004152
nih.gov 0.004081
youtube.com 0.003625
thehealthcentralnetwork.com 0.00308
blogspot.com 0.002639
hhs.gov 0.002561
addtoany.com 0.002192
clinicaltrials.gov 0.002132
yahoo.com 0.002087
apple.com 0.001905
ftc.gov 0.001891
healthscout.com 0.001886
go.com 0.001873
foodfit.com 0.001872
cdc.gov 0.001871
5.1.3 TrustRank
Next, we performed TrustRank with 2 seeds which is obtained from top 15 websites after
running Inverse PageRank. As shown in Table 4.1, the seed set contains trustworthy sites and
commercial sites as well. The seed set should manually curated before used in TrustRank,
therefore we only included two seeds after manually curated − healthcentral.com, hon.ch − to
evaluate the accuracy of the TrustRank. Basically, TrustRank propagates the credible sites
based on the seed set. However, the TrustRank results in far less number of authoritative
sites within top 20 and unrelated sites such as ‘adobe.com’ and ‘apple.com’ are ranked high
within top 20.
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5.1.4 Modified TrustRank
After identifying the seed set automatically using AP clustering as shown in 4.2, we per-
formed our modified TrustRank algorithm. Modified TrustRank is improved from TrustRank
algorithm considering the number of outgoing links for each site. TrustRank only modify
the teleporting terms of the PageRank to propagate the trustworthy pages. However, since
we construct the domain-based web graph, we take into account the number of outgoing
links from node A to node B. Considering the number of outgoing links, we can weight
the importance of a node relatively. Modified TrustRank can be used for ranking each page
as well. We perform our ranking algorithm to get the trustworthy scores for assessing the
credibility of the domains. Since we define F(u, v) which is the number of links from node
u to node v. So our modified TrustRank is computed by Equation 5.1.
DR(u) = α ·
∑
v:(v,u)∈E
F(v, u)
ω(v)
· DR(v) + (1− α)d (5.1)
Modified TrustRank gives high ranks for the authoritative domains such as government
or organization sites so that the one can rely on their searched results in which biased or
commercially recommended information is excluded. The results of modified TrustRank have
been compared with the original PageRank and TrustRank. We used seeds from “hhs.gov”
cluster, which is 15 seeds, for modified TrustRank. The information sources are ranked based
on the trustworthiness scores returned. Top 10 sites excluding seeds are listed in Figure 5.4.
As seen from the figure, modified TrustRank gives all authoritative sites within top 10.
Furthermore, in order to compare the results with PageRank and TrustRank, we fix nih.gov,
hhs.gov as two seeds. In Table 5.5, the results show that definitely modified TrustRank
outperformed compared to other ranking algorithm, PageRank and TrustRank. However,
if we reduce the number of seed set, suspicious sites such as ‘thebody.com’ are ranked very
high. In oder to overcome this issue, we propose a content-based method for HealthTrust in
order to consider the semantics of the resources and it is explained in section 6.3.
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Table 5.4: Top 10 DomainTrust results with hhs.gov cluster
Name Score
samhsa.gov 0.062481
childwelfare.gov 0.062481
smokefree.gov 0.000057
epa.gov 0.000045
amia.org 0.000045
letsmove.gov 0.000032
aafp.org 0.000031
himss.org 0.000031
medlineplus.gov 0.000012
aafa.org 0.000011
Table 5.5: Comparison with PageRank, TrustRank and DomainTrust
Rank PageRank TrustRank DomainTrust
1 twitter.com nih.gov nih.gov
2 facebook.com hhs.gov hhs.gov
3 healthcentral.com usa.gov epa.gov
4 yogawiz.com adobe.com smokefree.gov
5 google.com cdc.gov amia.org
6 hon.ch whitehouse.gov letsmove.gov
7 adobe.com twitter.com unc.edu
8 youtube.com youtube.com washingtonpost.com
9 usa.gov fda.gov about.com
10 nih.gov facebook.com aboutgerd.org
11 thehealthcentralnetwork.com medlineplus.gov thebody.com
12 blogspot.com usda.gov alzfdn.org
13 cdc.gov microsoft.com expasy.org
14 hhs.gov flu.gov reflux.org
15 digg.com gpo.gov flu.gov
16 feedburner.com medicare.gov aanma.org
17 doubleclick.com usdoj.gov asph.org
18 ftc.com dhhs.gov aolnews.com
19 delicious.com opm.gov clinicaltrials.gov
20 addtoany.com ahrq.gov nof.org
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5.2 Term Frequency
Term Frequency (TF) is commonly used weighting scheme in information retrieval to char-
acterize a document by counting the number of occurrences of the term in the document.
Mostly, TF is combined with Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) for relatively weighting
the term occurrences in a corpus, which is called TF-IDF. TF-IDF is calculated using the
Equation 5.2 : the number of times the term appeared in a document (Term Frequency)
multiplied by the rareness of the term across all documents in a corpus (IDF). TF-IDF pro-
vides the distribution of terms in a corpus weighting the frequency of the terms. Therefore
unimportant terms or strop word such as ‘’the’ can be filtered out. Initially, simple ranking
systems only calculate the TF-IDF for the query since the more the query appears in a
document, the more the document is related.
tfidf(t, d,D) = tf(t, d)× idf(t, d,D)
tf(t, d) = f(t,d)
max{f(w,d):w∈d} ,
idf(t, d,D) = log |D||{d∈D:t∈d}|
(5.2)
where t is the term, d is a document, and |D| is the total number of documents.
In this proposal, we evaluated the distribution of term frequency between credible and
suspicious sites. First, we randomly selected six credible sites from authoritative sites and six
suspicious sites from commercial sites. We calculated the difference of credible and suspicious
TF values, tf(Good)− tf(Bad). Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show the distribution of top 20 TF terms
for tf(Good) − tf(Bad) and tf(Bad) − tf(Good). As seen in the figures, the top 20 terms
are very different from each case. Credible sites use more general terms related to health and
suspicious sites tend to use more specific terms related to their websites’ products. However,
we cannot say the sites are untrustworthy because it is possible that they use their own
terms in their site for advertise their products. In addition, only using TF or TF-IDF has
a limitation for ranking problem, since it doesn’t consider any semantics at all and only
dependents on the frequency of the terms occurred in a document. Therefore we need a
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Figure 5.1: Top 20 terms from tf(Good)− tf(Bad)
further study to analyze the semantics for trustworthiness.
In this preliminary work, a thorough study over a large volume of online healthcare infor-
mation websites collected by a focused crawler is presented. With a focus on the providers
of such information, questions such as who they are, how they are distributed, and how they
are related were answered. The network structural features, analyze the graph topology, and
study the nodes and links distributed over top level domains are also measured. Two link
analysis approaches, PageRank and HITS to study the authoritativeness of websites based
on graph topology are used. As the results are shown, traditional approaches give mixed
results of credible, suspicious, and irrelevant sites.
With two user studies, commercial search engine results for health-related queries are far
from satisfactory and many untrustworthy or highly suspicious sites are returned. Meanwhile
it is not easy for users to distinguish trustworthy sites from the mixed results. A reliable
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mechanism to automatically determine the trustworthiness of online healthcare information
is highly desired.
The next step of the project is to implement such a mechanism. Ideally, it will assess the
credibility of online healthcare information sources by evaluating their topological relation-
ships and content similarities with trusted websites. However, it is still highly challenging to
assess content similarity at semantic level. Meanwhile, another interesting future direction
is to further understand healthcare information consuming behaviors of the users.
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Chapter 6
The HealthTrust System
The fundamental goal of our research is to assess the trustworthiness of healthcare infor-
mation on the Web. As well recognized, healthcare information is growing exponentially
along with the web technologies such as social networking services, real-time web technolo-
gies such as wikis, blogs, and RSS (Really Simple Syndication). However, not all health
information provided online is trustworthy. Although trustworthiness of the online health-
care information is essential for a great number of daily users, not much work has been
done in determining the trustworthiness of these sources so far. In this section, we propose
a new methodology, called HealthTrust. The HealthTrust aims to identify the trustworthy
information automatically in the flood of healthcare related data on the Web and provide
more credible guidance to consumers.
The overview of HealthTrust framework is introduced in 6.1. Section 7.1.1 describes the
data set we will use for the proposed research. More explanation of each component of the
HealthTrust is given in Section 6.2 and 6.3 in detail.
6.1 Overview of the HealthTrust
The HealthTrust algorithms consist of three phases; Structure-based Analysis, Content-based
Analysis and Integration. The two approaches are integrated for ranking a final HealthTrust
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the HealthTrust
score for each node. Figure 6.1 shows the overall system structure of HealthTrust. In
the first phase, Affinity Propagation (AP) [27] clustering is adopted to find the seed set
automatically. Such clusters will be easily identifiable and used as (positive and negative)
seeds in the future steps. Based on the seed set, our new ranking algorithm is performed to
propagate the trustworthy information and produces the ranking scores for each node. Next,
in the second phase, the consistency of contents between healthcare-related webpages and
trusted sites is evaluated. Due to the lack of semantic analysis for traditional topic modeling
based on the frequency of the words in a document, we conduct two novel approaches, Topic
Analysis and Hidden Markov Model analysis. Using two methods, we would like to identify
the trustworthiness of the contents. As a result of the both analysis, content similarity scores
are generated for each method. Then, we get a final verdict - a HealthTrust score for each
node integrating structure-based and content-based analysis with an iterative way. In the
following sections, we describe each component of HeathTrust framework in more detail.
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The related research for ranking websites has commonly used the structural information
such as url, domain names, xml properties, and link structure. However, existing methods
are not suitable to extract the meaningful information from unstructured data such as free-
style texts, tweets, or comments of Facebook. Since we take into account the semantic
analysis using topic modeling techniques and integrate with the structural ranking analysis,
our algorithms are more reliable and reasonable than the existing methods.
6.2 Structure-based Analysis
We use the seed sets obtained from AP clustering. As we mentioned earlier in the Chapter 4,
selecting seeds is sensitive and affects the ranking algorithm. However, AP clustering has
fundamental drawbacks. First, AP clustering may produce too many clusters containing
small number of elements. Since some nodes have only small number of links they refer, the
nodes can be isolated from other nodes. As a result, they form their own cluster with one
element which result in a lot of isolated clusters. Secondly, the authoritative sites may be
divided into different clusters. For example, if ‘nih.gov’ and ‘cdc.gov’ are found in different
clusters, we may miss an important hub by choosing one of the clusters. To address this
issue, we need a better way to select seed sets.
In this research, we simply select hubs from the clusters. Based on the AP clustering,
hubs or exemplars have the maximum affinity between other elements in the cluster. It
means that hubs play an important role in clusters, thus, hubs themselves can be a seed.
We make two groups of seed sets as positive seed set and negative seed set and assign the
same number of hubs into the two groups. However, if the cluster only contains one or two
nodes, we discard them since the nodes are not effective to form a cluster. Therefore we only
consider clusters with more than three elements.
After we get the seed sets, we perform a new ranking algorithm to propagate the trustwor-
thy websites. As seen in the Chapter 5.1.3, TrustRank performs better than the PageRank,
56
but still it contains many suspicious sites due to its seed set. Our new automatic seed set
selection method overcomes the problem. Another problem is that TrustRank is too sensi-
tive to propagate the trustworthy websites than we expected. If the graph becomes greatly
enlarged, then the speed of propagation might not be satisfactory. Hence we use a new
ranking algorithm improved from TrustRank.
With a new ranking algorithm, called TwoWay-TrustRank, we can start a parallel prop-
agation. Since we have two seed sets, positive and negative sets, TwoWay-Rank propagates
to the credible and suspicious nodes in a graph simultaneously. we expect the algorithm to
be less sensitive and produce accurate ranking scores with faster execution time. In order to
implement this method, we define the teleporting factor d in a different way. We don’t start
d = 1 for seed set. For the positive seed set, the teleporting factor is a positive number, and
for negative seed set d is a negative number, for instance, 1 and -1 respectively.
6.3 Content-based Analysis
We want to identify the veracity or trustworthiness of the information provided in health-
care sites by performing content analysis using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and Topic
modeling. Our approach is to be able to classify the information available in the healthcare
domain into two categories:
• trustworthy websites like www.health.gov and other similar .gov or .edu sites
• suspicious sites which often end with a .com as a part of their domain name
In order to differentiate the content available in these two categories of websites, we need
to examine the information presented in these sites. In general, the information presented
in websites tend to be a combination of both trustworthy and suspicious information. Since
a sentence is a more fundamental unit for presenting information, we plan to perform the
analysis at the level of the sentences available in these websites. In our approach, we have
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built two HMMs: one to model a trustworthy sentence from a trustworthy site and another
to model a suspicious sentence from a suspicious website. The models trained on sample
sentences from the good and bad websites respectively can then be used to evaluate candidate
sentences to identify if they are similar to the trustworthy or suspicious sentences. All
candidate sentences in a given web page can be evaluated similarly and then an aggregate
measure or a classifier can be used to determine if the content of a page is trustworthy or
not. Similarly an aggregate measure of all pages from a particular website can be evaluated
to determine whether the website as a whole can be deemed as a suspicious or bad website.
In our other approach to this problem we employ the technique of topic modeling, to iden-
tify salient topics in the sentences present as a part of the various healthcare websites. Topics
are identified using TagMe and correspond to the titles of articles available in Wikipedia. An
analysis of the similarity measures the topics identified is used to decide if the information
from candidate website falls under the suspicious or trustworthy category.
In our approach using the Hidden Markov Model we chose to use all the candidate
sentences available from a website for building our good and bad sentence models rather
relying only on sentences which were identified to contain salient topics. This is due to the
fact that some of the sentences that contain characteristics of a trustworthy or suspicious
information may not be necessarily be identified to contain a salient topic.
6.3.1 Hidden Markov Model Analysis
6.3.1.1 Sentence Classification
In general, an HMM is used to create a model with hidden states that represent the latent
characteristics of the pattern that we are trying to model, which however emit symbols or
observations that are visible. In case of sentence modeling, the hidden states would represent
the characteristics of the sentence that we are trying to model while the words forming the
sentence would represent the visible observations. HMM uses a supervised learning method
were a training set is provided to train the model to identify sentences represented by the
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model. The Baum Welch algorithm is used to train HMM to learn the transition and
observation probabilities. Once trained, the HMM can then be used for computing the
probability of a sentence belonging to given model using the Forward-Backward algorithm
or can be used to predict the possible hidden state sequence that could have generated a
given sequence of observations using the Viterbi algorithm.
In our approach we create two separate HMMs: one to model the suspicious sentences and
the other to model trustworthy sentences. Once these HMMs are trained, the probability of
any new sentence belonging to both the models is determined. The sentence is then classified
to belong to a model which has the highest probability value. The following sections detail
the construction of the two sentence models using HMM.
Suspicious Sentence Model Following are some of the features present as a part
of the sentences from suspicious websites which have been used to build a Hidden Markov
model that is representative of such sentences.
1. Most of suspicious websites often contain testimonials or personal experiences of people
trying to promote or sell a particular product. Most often the information in such sites
presented in a highly subjective manner with first person narratives describing their
experiences. Such sentences can be easily identified with the start of sentence having
the pronoun I. Example: a. I thought you should know that I have now lost 23 pounds,
beyond the 11 pounds when I wrote the testimonial.
2. In addition to first person experiences, some of the suspicious web sites also have second
person directives where the author provides instructions for the reader to follow. Again
these are with the intent of coercing the user to avail some services or make purchases
in order to address their problem. Most of these can be identified by the presence of
modal verbs like should, must, need to, have to and ought to that help enforce the
directions. Example: a. You must combine the diet pill usage with diet plans and do
at least some aerobics for half an hour.
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3. In most cases the information presented in the suspicious sites tend to resort to su-
perlatives in order to sell the products or services. These can be identified by the
presence of superlative like most, best, worst, etc in the sentences. Examples: a. This
is the best method and I am shocked that dermatologists don’t recommend it. b. The
best thing is that the pill works in the human intestines and therefore it does not have
many side effects.
4. With the intent of the suspicious sites in general being to sell some kind of service or
product to the end user, we can identify the presence of several commercially related
terms appearing as a part of the content. Examples: a. Subscribe today and receive
four free ebooks worth $60 . b. You have the same no-risk, money-back offer on this
all-time best-selling ebook as you do with all burn the fat products.
5. In addition we would also find occurrences of some suspicious words and content that
appear to promise a guaranteed solution with no scientific study or references to back
them up. Most of websites that talk about using supplements, hypnosis, holistic or
alternative treatments fall under this category. Examples: a. This amazing beverage
helps fight your risk of heart attack and heart disease in several other ways. b. It’s
irrefutable - even neuroscientists are now forced to agree - this powerful formula for
getting a stunning body with mind power is fool proof!
6. Finally one other commonly observed pattern among the content from suspicious web-
sites is the presence of several sentences that end with an exclamation mark. Most
often these sites tend to convey strong feelings in emphasizing the capabilities of a
product or in commanding the user to take an action and hence end with an exclama-
tion. Examples: a. I will definitely buy this tea again! b. Guaranteed results or your
money back! c. Stop procrastinating!
States of the Suspicious HMM
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So the different features or characteristics identified earlier can be combined to represent
the states of a Hidden Markov Model that can be used to model a sentence from a suspicious
website. Since a HMM is typically used to model sequential data, the above features can be
represented using the following states to model a sentence containing a sequence of words
or tokens. Since some of these features can be easily identified if the sentence is annotated
with Part-Of-Speech tags, we make use of the Stanford NLP tagger to identify the POS tags
for the sentences.
• Personal Pronoun (PRP). This is a part-of-speech tag that can be used to represent the
personal pronoun like I and you which can used to identify the first person narratives
and second person directives in the sentences
• Modal verbs (MD): Identifies modal verbs like should, must, need to, ought to and
have to found in sentences commanding a user to take action
• Superlatives: Presence of superlative adjectives or superlative adverbs identified with
the part-of-speech tags JJS and RBS respectively
• Commercial terms: Presence of the following set of commercial terms or keywords.
This list was manually extracted based on term frequency analysis on the extracted
content from the suspicious websites. Table 6.1 shows the examples of commercial
terms.
• Suspicious terms: Presence of the following set of suspicious terms or keywords. This
list was manually extracted based on term frequency analysis on the extracted content
from the suspicious websites. Table 6.2 shows the examples of some suspicious terms.
• Exclamation: Presence of the exclamatory sign at the end of the sentence.
• Other: The other state is used to represent words that do not fallen under any of the
above mentioned states.
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Figure 6.2: State transitions in a trained HMM representing a suspicious sentence model
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Table 6.1: List of Commercial terms
money advertise purchased prizes fees order
money-back advertised customer ebook shop orders
pay loan customers ebooks shopping ordering
payment loans dollar discount world-class popular
payments service dollars discounts membership worldwide
repayment services endorsement cheap one-time product
shipping program endorsements expensive offer products
free programs price inexpensive sale review
buy purchase prices subscription sales reviews
buying purchases credit fee sold cash
payday compensated affiliate affiliates bonus bonuses
Table 6.2: List of Suspicious terms
hypnosis proven success burn
hypnotherapy guarantee successful burning
hypnotherapists guaranteed story flawless
self-hypnosis trust stories result
supplement trusted lifesaver results
supplements testimonial formula amazing
pill testimonials formulas holistic
pills secret reliable session
alternative secrets magic sessions
healing lifetime magical perfect
miracle miracles miraculous
Figure 6.2 displays the states of the suspicious Sentence Model HMM, after being trained
on the data from the training set. The probability values displayed on the arcs are the
transition probability values. The nodes with a double circle are used to denote the possible
starting states for the HMM and have Pi value denoting the probability of starting in that
state.
Trustworthy Sentence Model
Following are some of the features present as a part of the sentences from trustworthy
sites that have been used to build a HMM that is representative of such sentences.
1. Most the sentences that provide credible information often tend to be expressed in
Passive voice. The passive voice can be detected in general by the presence of the
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Noun-Verb-Noun format in the sentence where the first noun is typically the Object and
the second noun is usually the Subject. So in general identifying the Noun-verb-noun
format helps to identify possible credible sentences. Examples: a. CRE infections(N)
are caused(V) by a family of germs(N) that are a normal part of a person’s healthy
digestive system. b. Aneurysms(N) can also be caused (V) by serious infections (N).
2. In case of the passive voice the verb forms that are used tend to be either:
• a “be” form verb like be, am, is are, was, were, been, being
• a “have” form verb like have, has, had, having
• a past tense verb
• a particle verb
Examples: a. Infection risk can be reduced by practicing good hygiene, such as washing
hands often b. These are found in the blood of patients who have been infected with
EBV.
3. The nouns that are used as part of the sentence could be of the following form:
• Proper nouns that are usually names of things or places.
• Gerunds, verbs followed by -ing, acting as nouns, eg: Smoking, Cycling, etc.
• Also nouns other than Proper nouns that can appear in the singular or plural
form.
Examples: a. A bronchoscope is inserted through the nose or mouth into the trachea
and lungs. b. Neuroendocrine tumor cells take up the radioactive MIBG and are
detected by a scanner. c. Stretching and weight training can also strengthen your
body and improve your fitness level. d. Coughing up mucus is often the first sign of
COPD.
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States of the Trustworthy HMM In order to represent the above characteristics to
model a Trustworthy sentence model we define the following states of the HMM:
• Proper Noun (PRN): Identifies nouns that may be names of places, things, etc.
• Be Form Verb (BFV): Identifies verbs like: be, am, is are, was, were, been, being
• Have Form Verb (HFV): Identifies verbs like: have, has, had, having
• Past Tense Verb (PTV): Identifies a verb mentioned in the past tense
• Gerund (GER): Identifies if a word is a gerund
• Participle Verb (PAV): Identifies if a verb is present participle or past participle
• Other Noun (OTN): Identifies nouns other than proper nouns
• Other words (OTH): Identifies all other words that do not fit into the above categories
Figure 6.3 displays the states of the Trustworthy Sentence Model HMM, after being
trained on the data from the training set. The probability values displayed on the arcs are
the transition probability values. The nodes with a double circle are used to denote the
possible starting states for the HMM and have Pi value denoting the probability of starting
in that state.
Sentence Classification into Trustworthy and Suspicious models For each sen-
tence the probability of it belonging to either of the models is computed and the sentence is
classified to belong to the model which has the highest probability.
6.3.1.2 Page classification
Once the sentences have been classified using the HMM based classifiers, their probabilities
and frequency counts are used to further classify if the page containing those sentences is
trustworthy or not. A Support Vector Machine based classifier is explored to make this
prediction.
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Figure 6.3: State transitions in a trained HMM representing a suspicious sentence model
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Page Level Features For every web page based on the HMM based sentence classifica-
tion we compute the counts for total number of sentences, number of trustworthy sentences,
number of suspicious sentences and number of neutral sentences. In order to obtain the page
level features, for each sentence in a page we compute:
D = Probabilityofsentencebeingtrustworthy?Probabilityofsentencebeingsuspicious
(6.1)
The value of the above difference, D, is then used to update the counts of a histogram whose
values range from -1.0 to +1.0. Each bucket in the histogram has an interval which covers
the range of 1.0E-10. The counts are then normalized by the total number of sentences in
the page. In all there are 23 buckets in the histogram.
6.3.2 Topic Analysis
6.3.2.1 Term-distribution Analysis
Traditional topic modeling approaches are based on “bag-of-words” model. Therefore the
frequency of the terms is an important factor for the topic analysis. To analyze the term
distributions of the health-related web pages, firstly we construct a medical-related term
dictionary from MedlinePlus [1] built by NIH. We adopt the health topic categories from
MedlinePlus which is classified into thirty categories. Each category contains medical terms
or general healthcare terms. Some terms appear redundantly in several categories, however,
we collect the terms whereas they are in. In addition, we allow the exact match for topics
for multiple words such as ‘breast cancer’. Table 6.3 shows the thirty categories and the
number of terms in the category. The total number of terms is 2243.
In order to find the term distributions of authoritative and suspicious sites, we chose
‘www.cdc.gov’ and ‘top10weightcontrol.com’ as sample sites. Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show
the term distributions of both sites respectively. As shown in the figures, ‘cdc.gov’ matches
many terms from MedlinePlus, especially Pregnancy and Reproduction (157 terms), Trans-
67
!"
#!"
$!"
%!"
&!"
'!!"
'#!"
'$!"
'%!"
'&!"
'" #" (" $" )" %" *" &" +" '!" ''" '#" '(" '$" ')" '%" '*" '&" '+" #!" #'" ##" #(" #$" #)" #%" #*" #&" #+" (!"
!"#$%&'()
Figure 6.4: Term distribution of www.cdc.gov
!"
#"
$"
%"
&"
'"
("
)"
*"
#" $" %" &" '" (" )" *" +" #!" ##" #$" #%" #&" #'" #(" #)" #*" #+" $!" $#" $$" $%" $&" $'" $(" $)" $*" $+" %!"
!"#$%&'()
Figure 6.5: Term distribution of top10weightcontrol.com
plantation and Donation (117 terms), and Disasters (75 terms). However, most terms in
thirty categories appeared in the ‘cdc.gov’ web site. Compared to ‘cdc.gov’, the suspicious
site ‘top10weightcontrol.com’ only matched few terms among the categories such as Preg-
nancy and Reproduction (7 terms), Symptoms (4 times), and Social/Family Issues (6 terms).
Based on the term distributions, we expect that topics identified from MedlinePlus can be
used to distinguish the trustworthy sites and suspicious sites. However, this term dictionary
cannot cover all general health related terms or similar concepts in the text, we need a more
systematic method to identify the topics.
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Table 6.3: The number of terms in the category
Health Topics Category
The number of
terms
Disorders and
Conditions
1. Cancers 150
2. Diabetes Mellitus 170
3. Genetics/Birth Defects 15
4. Infections 30
5. Injuries and Wounds 27
6. Mental Health and Behavior 27
7. Metabolic Problems 50
8. Poisoning, Toxicology, Environmen-
tal Health
13
9. Pregnancy and Reproduction 120
10. Substance Abuse Problems 102
Diagnosis and
Therapy
11. Complementary and Alternative
Therapies
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12. Diagnostic Tests 253
13. Drug Therapy 128
14. Surgery and Rehabilitation 55
15. Symptoms 82
16. Transplantation and Donation 50
Demographic
Groups
17. Children and Teenagers 29
18. Men 56
19. Population Groups 32
20. Seniors 98
21. Women 46
Health and
Wellness
22. Disasters 111
23. Fitness and Exercise 51
24. Food and Nutrition 49
25. Health System 59
26. Personal Health Issues 69
27. Safety Issues 90
28. Sexual Health Issues 22
29. Social/Family Issues 61
30. Wellness and Lifestyle 141
6.3.2.2 Topic Identification
In order to perform topic analysis, web pages from a manually selected set of 20 trustworthy
and suspicious sites were gathered to form our reference sites. Plain text sentences were
extracted from these pages and TAGME was used to identify semantic topics in these sen-
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tences. As described in Section 2.4.1.1, TAGME provides the goodness value of a topic and
its corresponding topic word. We used a certain goodness threshold for choosing meaningful
topics among all the topics in a sentence obtained from TAGME.
6.3.2.3 Page-Level Similarity
The similarity between pages is measured after identifying the semantic topics for each page.
Since each page contains representative topics, we can compare the similarities with each
other. For calculating page-level similarity, we use the most popular set-similarity method
called Jaccard similarity and it can be obtained by:
PageSim(xi, yi) =
Total number of same topics
Total number of topics
(6.2)
where xi and yi are pages from each website. Based on this, we can calculate the page-level
similarity score between pages.
6.3.2.4 Site-Level Similarity
Next, in order to get the site-level similarity, we adopted Group Linkage problem. [43] Group
Linkage problem is used to identify the similarity between two groups which have different
number of elements. The fundamental idea of the group linkage is based on Maximum
Bipartite Matching(MBM) problem. [61] The definition of MBM similarity is defined as
below:
Let A and B be two sets, A = a1, a2, ..., am and B = b1, b2, ..., bn. The Maximum Bipartite
Matching Similarity, MBM Sim, is defined as:
MBM Sim(A,B) =
∑
(ai,bj)∈M sim(ai, bj)
m+ n−M
(6.3)
where sim(ai, bj) ≥ ρ is the similarity of two elements in the two groups A and B. M is the
number of maximum weight matching in the bipartite graph. In our approach, sim(ai, bj)
would be the page-level similarity above ρ. The threshold ρ is to remove the pages having
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very low similarity scores and can be decided heuristically. Using MBM Sim, we get the
similarity score between two web sites.
Finally, in order to evaluate the trustworthiness of unknown site X, we defined the
ContentSim(X) as below:
ContentSim(X) = [Sum of Top5 Site− Level − Similarity of Trustworthy Sites]
− [Sum of Top5 Site− Level − Similarity of Suspicious Sites]
(6.4)
The content similarity of site X, ContentSim(X), is the difference between the summation
of top 5 site-level-similarity from trustworthy group and the summation of top 5 site-level-
similarity from suspicious sites. If the value of ContentSim score is positive, we consider that
site X contains trustworthy information. If not, it contains suspicious information.
6.4 Integration
We developed a new algorithm to integrate two components of HealthTrust, Structure and
Content-based analysis for getting the final HealthTrust scores; the first one is the trust rank-
ing scores ranged between 0 and 1, showing how much the website is relatively trustworthy
based on the link structure; and the second one is similarity scores ranging from positive
to negative scores, showing that how much the contents of website has similar semantics
compared to the positive and negative seed sets. Thus we can measure the trustworthiness
from the structure and the semantics from contents by the two methods. Overall, our new
integrating algorithm should combine those two orthogonal concepts effectively. Thus we ex-
pect the integrated algorithm to distinguish each node’s characteristics even though a node
has high trust ranking scores but low semantic scores, the combined scores should represent
the different characteristics of both analyses.
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6.4.1 Overview of the algorithm
Structure-based Analysis is solely based on the link structure of the web graph. However,
we use the TwoWay-TrustRank algorithm to propagate the trustworthiness of a website
considering its positive and negative factors. Also, Content-based Analysis is performed
using the semantics of the sentences in a document. Therefore the characteristics of the two
methods are orthogonal. A challenging problem is that how we can combine them without
losing their orthogonal features. In order to integrate effectively, we developed a new iterative
algorithm that performs what it needs to be as we mentioned above.
6.4.2 Integration of Structure Analysis and Content Analysis (ISACA)
The overall algorithm procedure is shown in Figure 6.6. The inputs for the ISACA algorithm
are two scores from Structure-based analysis and Content-based Analysis, two sets from
positive and negative seed sets and the list of all websites in the web graph. First, we run
the TrustRank algorithm to find out the first rank of all sites with the positive and negative
sets. For decay factor for TrustRank, we set the d = 1 for the positive seed set and d = −1
for the negative seed set. Then we sort the new TrustRank list by descending order and find
fixed number of websites, StepSize=k, for top k sites into the positive and negative seed sets.
For positive seed set, we select top sites and for negative seed set, we select lowest ranking
sites.
Then based on the updated seed sets after running TwoWay-TrustRank, we run Content-
based algorithm with identified topics for all sites using TAGME. Content-based algorithm
also provides similarity scores for all sites to the reference seed sets. The rank list is sorted
by descending order based on the similarity. Like the previous step, the positive and negative
seed sets are updated by the new content-similarity scores. However, we want to integrate
the structure-based approach and content-based approach, so we find the intersection of both
sets and generate the integrated positive and negative seed sets for next iterations.
Next, we need to consider when the iterative routines should be stopped. In order to
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identify the stop condition, we compare the two final ranked lists from the Structure-based
analysis and those of Content-based analysis. We check the distance for each site between
the two lists using RMSD error. For example, if site A is ranked 5 in the TwoWay-TrustRank
(TR) and ranked 9 in the Content Similarity (CR), then the distance between two values
are (9− 5)2 and then we can calculate the RMSD distance error between two lists by the
equation (6.5).
RMSD =
√∑n
t=1 (TR(Xt)− CR(Xt))2
N
(6.5)
We expect the value of RMSD to decrease as the algorithm iterates. Therefore if RMSD is
less than the threshold , we don’t need to go further for next iteration step. However, if the
seed sets are very different from each other, we then go to the step 2 to run the TrustRank
again and so on. Therefore the algorithm runs iteratively until the seed sets are very similar
to each other. We set a threshold to make the algorithm converge after a certain number of
iterations.
Step Size The step size (StepSize) for updating the seed sets can be decided heuristi-
cally depending on the data set size. Therefore the step size should be reasonably chosen;
(StepSize) ≤ (Total number of sites). If the StepSize is too bug then the seed sets would
increase too fast. And if it is too small, then the runtime of the algorithm would be very
slow in case the data set is really big. However, we need to consider that if we include the
seed set from the best and worst cases in the lists all the time, then the seed set is hardly
changed so we might always get similar seed set list after several iteration.
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Figure 6.6: Integration algorithm
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Chapter 7
Experiments and Results
7.1 Data Set
In order to construct a healthcare related Web graph, we use the crawled data set as we
described in Chapter 3. We gather healthcare webpages by crawling the Web. Figure7.1
shows the process of constructing a Web graph in the diagram. We construct a Web graph
by analyzing the degree of incoming and outgoing links of the pages. In our Web graph,
the nodes can be webpages or websites. Since the data set is huge, the Web graph is very
complicated.
Crawled 
Pages 
10# 5#
1#
3#
1#
3#
1#
1#
Iden%fy(the(links(
between(domains(
Construct(a(Web(network(
Figure 7.1: Data Preparation
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7.1.1 HMM Data Set
7.1.1.1 Manually annotated Seed Data Set
In order to train and test the HMMs a Seed Data set consisting of a small number of
sentences were manually annotated to form the train and test sets for both the trustworthy
and suspicious sentence models.
Suspicious Sentences Training Set For the suspicious sentences training set, 150
sentences, 15 from each of the following 10 suspicious sites were manually annotated and
used for training the HMM:
• amazing-green-tea
• apple-cider-vinegar-benefits
• burnthefat
• carallumaburnreviews
• dietprescriptions-rx
• eco-diet
• fatvanish
• hypnosisnetwork
• fatburningfurnace
• healthynewage
Suspicious Sentences Validation Set All sentences extracted from the following
suspicious sites are used as a part of the validation data set to evaluate the classification
accuracy for suspicious sentences predicted using the HMM classifiers:
• amazing-green-tea
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• apple-cider-vinegar-benefits
• best-colon-cleanse
• burnthefat
• calorie-count
• calorieking
• dieting4weightloss
• eco-diet
• fatvanish
• Herbalife
• hypnosisnetwork
• weightloss-diet-facts
Trustworthy Sentences Validation Set All sentences extracted from the following
trustworthy sites are used as a part of the validation data set to evaluate the classification
accuracy for trustworthy sentences predicted using the HMM classifiers:
• cancer
• cdc
• drugs
• flu
• nih
77
7.1.1.2 Real Data Set
After the validation, the classification accuracy of the HMM based classifiers are evaluated
on the Real Data set. Suspicious Sentences Real Data Set All sentences extracted
from the following suspicious sites are used as a part of the Real Data Set to evaluate the
real classification accuracy for suspicious sentences predicted using the HMM classifiers:
• blogtalkradio
• comcblog
• devinalexander
• directselling411
• discovergoodnutrition
• flite
• goodhousekeeping
• losethebellyfatnow
• ocregister
• planetarynutrition
• plentyofhealth
• premadeniches
• wholefoodsmarket
• widgetbox
• zendesk
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Trustworthy Sentences Real Data Set All sentences extracted from the following
trustworthy sites are used as a part of the Real Data Set to evaluate the real classification
accuracy for trustworthy sentences predicted using the HMM classifiers:
• ChooseMyPlate
• clinicaltrials
• dana-farber
• diabetes
• drugabuse
• foodsafety
• hhs
• kidshealth
• letsmove
• mayoclinic
• nemours
• nutrition
• usa
• webmd
• womenshealth
79
7.2 Evaluation
7.2.1 HMM evaluation
7.2.1.1 Sentence Classification
Sentence Classification with the Seed Data Set The following Table ?? provides
the results of the classification on the Seed Data Set consisting of both the suspicious and
Trustworthy train and test data sets.
Data set Total
sen-
tences
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
neutral
Classification
Accuracy
Suspicious Train
Set
150 149 1 0 99.33%
Suspicious Test
Set
120 0 150 0 100%
Trustworthy
Train Set
150 0 150 0 100%
TrustworthyTest
Set
150 39 111 0 74%
Table 7.1: Sentence Classification for manually annotated Seed Data Sets
Sentence Classification with the Validation Data Set The following Table 7.2
provides the results of the classification on the Validation Data Set consisting of sentences
from the suspicious sites.
The following Table 7.3 provides the results of the classification on the Validation Data
Set consisting of sentences from the trustworthy sites.
Sentence Classification with the Real Data Set The following Table ?? pro-
vides the results of the classification on the Real Data Set consisting of sentences from the
suspicious sites.
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Website Total
sen-
tences
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Number
of clas-
sified as
neutral
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
sen-
tences
Baseline
Website
classifi-
cation
based on
sentence
classifica-
tion
Herbalife 1993 1029 959 5 48.12% Trustworthy
amazing-
green-tea
14130 5199 8889 42 62.91% Suspicious
apple-
cider-
vinegar-
benefits
57093 11647 45327 119 79.39% Suspicious
best-colon-
cleanse
6440 3350 3089 1 47.97% Trustworthy
burnthefat 9233 2487 6717 29 72.75% Suspicious
calorie-
count
325 100 223 2 68.62% Suspicious
calorieking 1711 534 918 259 53.65% Suspicious
dieting4weightloss3316 1434 1878 4 56.63% Suspicious
eco-diet 6745 2604 4135 6 61.30% Suspicious
fatvanish 279473 23766 253560 2147 90.73% Suspicious
hypnosisnetwork32057 11883 15631 4543 48.76% Suspicious
weightloss-
diet-facts
4968 1909 3059 0 61.57% Suspicious
Table 7.2: Sentence Classification on Validation Data Set for Suspicious Sites
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Website Total
sen-
tences
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Number
of clas-
sified as
neutral
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
sen-
tences
Baseline
Website
classifi-
cation
based on
sentence
classifica-
tion
cancer 8592 7647 729 216 89% Trustworthy
cdc 3430 2223 1160 47 64.81% Trustworthy
drugs 13773 7219 6534 20 52.41% Trustworthy
flu 1509 1008 498 3 66.8% Trustworthy
nih 7167 5302 1702 163 73.98% Trustworthy
Table 7.3: Sentence Classification on Validation Data Set for Trustworthy Sites
7.2.1.2 Page Classification
From the Validation data sets for the trustworthy and suspicious websites, sentence level
classification is carried out for all sentences in all the pages belonging to those sites. The
page level features as mentioned before are extracted for all the pages. In all 2329 instances
of suspicious page features are extracted from the suspicious Validation data set and 1140
instances of trustworthy page features are extracted from the trustworthy Validation data
set. The extracted page level features from the Validation data set are then used from the
training and testing data set for the SVM classifier that would be used for page classification.
SVM Cross-validation The extracted feature values from the Validation data set are
then scaled to normalize the values of the features. A 10-fold cross validation is then carried
out to identified the best parameters for the SVM. Parameter values of C = 128 and g = 0.5
were identified as the best parameters after the cross-validation giving an accuracy of 92.15%
Those values are then used to actually train the full training data set to form the learnt SVM
model. The classification accuracy of the trained SVM on the training data set was 95.96%.
Page classification on Validation data set The following Table 7.5 lists the clas-
sification accuracy for the SVM based page classifier for the pages available for training and
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Website Total
sen-
tences
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Number
of clas-
sified as
neutral
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
sen-
tences
Baseline
Website
classifi-
cation
based on
sentence
classifica-
tion
blogtalkradio 7852 3908 3637 307 46.32% Suspicious
comcblog 9872 4810 4933 129 49.97% Suspicious
devinalexander 1950 402 1541 7 79.03% Suspicious
directselling411 4315 2046 2260 2443 52.38% Suspicious
discovergoodnutrition3474 1031 1702 0 70.32% Suspicious
flite 3742 1826 1913 3 51.12% Suspicious
goodhousekeeping 5315 1626 3530 159 66.42% Suspicious
losethebellyfatnow 2235 704 1531 0 68.50% Suspicious
ocregister 7514 3570 3579 365 47.63% Suspicious
planetarynutrition 2516 1252 1264 0 50.24% Suspicious
lentyofhealth 8383 4667 3715 1 44.32% Trustworthy
premadeniches 5205 1376 3829 0 73.56% Suspicious
wholefoodsmarket 295 236 56 3 18.98% Trustworthy
widgetbox 5375 1018 4357 0 81.06% Suspicious
zendesk 2369 652 1697 20 71.63% Suspicious
Table 7.4: Sentence Classification on Real Data Set for Trustworthy Sites
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Website Total
pages
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
pages
Website
classifica-
tion based
on page
classifica-
tion
Herbalife 199 19 180 90.45% Suspicious
amazing-
green-tea
171 9 162 94.74% Suspicious
apple-
cider-
vinegar-
benefits
194 9 185 95.36% Suspicious
best-colon-
cleanse
176 1 175 99.43% Suspicious
burnthefat 81 4 77 95.06% Suspicious
calorie-
count
200 1 199 99.5% Suspicious
calorieking 192 10 182 94.79% Suspicious
dieting4weightloss396 0 396 100.0% Suspicious
eco-diet 402 2 400 99.50% Suspicious
fatvanish 240 26 214 89.17% Suspicious
hypnosisnetwork802 2 800 99.75% Suspicious
weightloss-
diet-facts
392 12 380 96.94% Suspicious
Table 7.5: Page Classification on Validation Data Set for Suspicious Sites
testing in the Validation set for the suspicious sites.
The following Table 7.6 lists the classification accuracy for the SVM based page classifier
for the pages available for training and testing in the Validation set for the trustworthy sites.
Page classification on Real Data Set Similarly for the real data set, in all 3295
instances of suspicious page features are extracted from the real suspicious data set and 2882
instances of trustworthy page features are extracted from the trustworthy real data set. The
following Table 7.7 lists the classification accuracy for the SVM based page classifier for the
pages available in the Real data set for the suspicious sites.
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Website Total
pages
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
pages
Website
classifica-
tion based
on page
classifica-
tion
cancer 256 249 7 97.27% Trustworthy
cdc 252 241 11 95.63% Trustworthy
drugs 200 184 16 92.0% Trustworthy
flu 98 95 3 96.94% Trustworthy
nih 334 305 29 91.32% Trustworthy
Table 7.6: Page Classification on Validation Data Set for Trustworthy Sites
Website Total
pages
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
pages
Website
classifica-
tion based
on page
classifica-
tion
blogtalkradio 200 64 136 68.0% Suspicious
comcblog 309 119 190 61.49% Suspicious
devinalexander 168 25 143 85.12% Suspicious
directselling411 203 102 101 49.75% Trustworthy
discovergoodnutrition192 38 154 80.21% Suspicious
flite 233 104 129 55.36% Suspicious
goodhousekeeping196 8 188 95.92% Suspicious
losethebellyfatnow154 42 112 72.73% Suspicious
ocregister 189 97 92 48.68% Trustworthy
planetarynutrition200 176 24 12.0% Trustworthy
plentyofhealth 201 31 170 84.58% Trustworthy
premadeniches 175 21 154 88.0% Suspicious
wholefoodsmarket199 5 194 97.49% Trustworthy
widgetbox 478 70 408 85.36% Suspicious
zendesk 198 24 174 87.88% Suspicious
Table 7.7: Page Classification on Real Data Set for Suspicious Sites
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Website Total
pages
Number
of clas-
sified as
trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspi-
cious
Classification
Accu-
racy of
Suspi-
cious
pages
Website
classifica-
tion based
on page
classifica-
tion
ChooseMyPlate 200 97 103 48.5% Suspicious
clinicaltrials 200 196 4 98.0% Trustworthy
dana-farber 198 147 51 74.24% Trustworthy
diabetes 200 97 103 48.5% Suspicious
drugabuse 192 38 154 80.21% Suspicious
foodsafety 50 33 17 66.0% Trustworthy
hhs 310 213 97 68.71% Trustworthy
kidshealth 187 83 104 44.39% Suspicious
letsmove 127 59 68 46.46% Suspicious
mayoclinic 294 112 182 38.10% Trustworthy
nemours 200 162 38 81.0% Trustworthy
nutrition 69 22 47 31.88% Suspicious
usa 103 50 53 48.54% Suspicious
webmd 198 27 171 13.64% Suspicious
womenshealth 166 89 77 53.61% Trustworthy
Table 7.8: Page Classification on Real Data Set for Trustworthy Sites
The following Table 7.8 lists the classification accuracy for the SVM based page classifier
for the pages available in the Real data set for the trustworthy sites. On average the overall
classification accuracy on the real test data set was 61.62%.
7.2.1.3 Website Classification
Classification Accuracy of Baseline Sentence Classification vs SVM Page Clas-
sification Table 7.9 below compares the website classification accuracy of the baseline sen-
tence classification approach to the SVM based page classification approach.
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Approach Data Set Total
Numbe of
web sites
Number of
classified
as trust-
worthy
Number
of clas-
sified as
suspicious
Classification
Accuracy
Baseline Real Data
for Suspicious
web sites
15 3 12 80%
Baseline Real Data for
Trustworthy
web sites
15 10 5 66.67%
SVM Page
Classification
Real Data
for Suspicious
web sites
15 3 12 80%
SVM Page
Classification
Real Data for
Trustworthy
web sites
15 6 9 40%
Table 7.9: Website Classification Baseline vs SVM Page classification
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Data Set
We tested our algorithm to real data set collected by the focused crawler. However, we
found that only 387 sites have the outgoing links to other sites. All other nodes are dangling
points or there are no connected sites. Therefore we ignore other sites in this experiments.
The real data set statics are shown in the Table ??. We gathered 63,894 files from the
387 sites and there are 59,702 non-empty files kong them. The total number of sentences
is 1,873,486. We preprocessed the raw html files removing all HTML tags and Javascript
languages. Furthermore, HMMs need natural language grammar, we made all sentences
capitalized at the beginning of the sentences which make it possible to understand sentences.
7.3.2 Topic Analysis Results
We used TAGME web application to get the semantic topics from the sentences including
short-text in a webpage. For example, we gathered all the pages from www.nih.gov and one
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Data set Total num-
ber of Files
Total
number
of Non-
empty
Files
Total
number
of Empty
Files
Total num-
ber of Sen-
tences
Total 63,894 59,702 4,192 1,873,486
Average 176.65 165.03 11.62 5194.75
Table 7.10: Summary of Real Data Sets
of the webpages contains mostly disease-related words or general words instead of showing
specific topics or product names shown in Table ??. The first column is a topic for the words
and the second column is a related category in Wikipedia.
However, TAGME provides a threshold how much we want to cut off the range of topics.
If we want to strict range of topics from a specific category, we can set the goodness of the
topic discovered which is called rho. The higher the threshold is, the mpre accurate topics
we can find. Therefore, according to the user’s criteria, we can set the value differently.
7.3.3 HMM Alnaysys Results
We tested our HMM analysis method using the real data set. As our evaluation shows the
HMM analysis works poor compared to Topic analysis. In real data set, it shows similar
results to the evaluation results. Most government sites are classified well in our data set.
However, many trustworthy sites sponsored by organizations or commercial industries are
not well classified. Because those web sites uses general terms or sentences instead of scien-
tific sentences. Since we strictly modeled the trustworthy HMM, many commercial sites are
classified as suspicious. Table 7.12 shows the government sites in our real data set and classi-
fied correctly. The examples for correctly classified suspicious sites are shown in Table 7.13.
However, Table 7.14 listed examples of wrong classified sites as shown below.
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Vaccine:Vaccine
Simian immunodeficiency virus
Monkey AIDS
HIV:AIDS Virus
Virus:Virus
Immune Attack:immune attack
Understanding:Understanding
Testosterone:Testosterone
Human:Men
Causality:effects
Body:body
Estrogen:estrogen
Brain tumor:brain tumors
Brain:Brain
Integrated circuit:Circuit
Visual system:Visual
Developmental biology:Development
Mouse:mouse,Research:study,Human eye:eyes
Therapy:treating
Amblyopia:amblyopia
Amblyopia:lazy eye
Bacteria:Bacteria
Neuron:Nerve Cells
Etiology:Cause
Pain:Pain
Stimulation:stimulate
Sensory neuron:sensory neurons
Neuron:neurons
Inflammation:inflammation
Insight:insights
Therapy:treatments
Table 7.11: Examples of topics discovered by TAGME
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Website Total
Pages
Trustworthy
Pages
Suspicious
Pages
Unclassified
Pages
HMM Classifica-
tion
Manual Classifi-
cation
childwelfare.gov291 274 17 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
cdc.gov 290 245 45 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
ahrq.gov 301 261 40 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
dhhs.gov 1 1 0 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
cms.gov 303 270 33 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
bls.gov 304 272 32 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
ca.gov 118 80 38 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
cancer.gov 225 187 38 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
clinicaltrials.gov299 223 76 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
childrenwithdiabetes.com301 152 149 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
allaboutvision.com289 224 65 0 Trustworthy Trustworthy
Table 7.12: Examples of Trustworthy Sites by HMM
Website Total
Pages
Trustworthy
Pages
Suspicious
Pages
Unclassified
Pages
HMM Classifica-
tion
Manual Classifi-
cation
doctorline.com272 114 158 0 Suspicious Suspicious
dietriffic.com 302 22 280 0 Suspicious Suspicious
central.com 69 24 45 0 Suspicious Suspicious
coolnurse.com 1 0 1 0 Suspicious Suspicious
brettterpstra.com1 0 1 0 Suspicious Suspicious
drgreene.com 282 10 272 0 Suspicious Suspicious
cancercompass.com323 138 185 0 Suspicious Suspicious
Table 7.13: Examples of Suspicious Sites by HMM
Website Total
Pages
Trustworthy
Pages
Suspicious
Pages
Unclassified
Pages
HMM Classifica-
tion
Manual Classifi-
cation
diabetesmonitor.com301 123 178 0 Suspicious Trustworthy
cancercenter.com314 41 273 0 Trustworthy Suspicious
best-home-
remedies.com
303 280 23 0 Trustworthy Suspicious
diabetes.org 329 20 309 0 Suspicious Trustworthy
aafp.org 301 134 167 0 Suspicious Trustworthy
amia.org 304 122 182 0 Suspicious Trustworthy
Table 7.14: Examples of Wrong Classified Sites
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7.3.4 Integration Results
We ran the ISACA algorithm using the real data set and found the updated positive seed
sets and negative seed sets from both analysis. Among them, we selected 20 sites inside
the positive and negative seed sets shown in Table ?? and Table ??. We started with small
number of seeds and expand the seed set after several iterations. The results showed that
most sites in positive seed sets are correctly grouped and negative seed set also contains
mostly suspicious sites.
Furthermore, we found that after running the TwoWay-TrustRank algorithm and Content
Similarity separately, they have the same sites with 80% and 52% for positive and negative
seed set respectively. The results are shown in Table 7.15 and 7.16.
7.3.4.1 RMSD Results
The graph 7.2 shows that the RMSD error rate is decreased after a few iterations. At the
beginning, RMSD is increased and then started decreasing at some point as we expected. It
means that after several iterations, the ranking lists from both structure- and content-based
analysis agree on choosing the trustworthiness sites cooperating the characteristics of each
other.
7.3.4.2 Integrated Seed Set Results
Since we take the integrated seed sets for both Structure and Content-based analysis in each
iterations after updating the seed sets, ??figseedsets
7.3.4.3 HealthTrust Ranking Results
We find the HealthTrust scores for each site by calculating the average of two scores from
Structure- and Content-based analysis. Table 7.17 shows the top 15 websites after performing
the ISACA algorithm and all sites within Top 15 is trustworthy. It outperforms link analysis
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No. Website
1 healthsquare.com
2 cdc.gov
3 inserm.fr
4 healthscout.com
5 msfocus.org
6 nextgen.com
7 ahaf.org
8 flu.gov
9 biochemj.org
10 medicinenet.com
11 hhs.gov
12 dhhs.gov
13 healthcare-ny.com
14 molinahealthcare.com
15 ccfa.org
16 healthcare411.org
17 healthonnet.org
18 hopkinsmedicine.org
19 nih.gov
20 cancer.gov
Table 7.15: Examples of Positive Seeds
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No. Website
1 expasy.ch
2 naturalsolutionsmag.com
3 momsmedicinechest.com
4 alternativedr.com
5 actagainstaids.org
6 fathersfirstyear.com
7 natural-homeremedies.com
8 central.com
9 medpagetoday.com
10 e-health-europe.com
11 mendosa.com
12 libertybella.com
13 fioricetnow.com
14 modernhealthcare.com
15 demandbase.com
16 homeremedypro.com
17 alsa.org
18 mymigraineconnection.com
19 acceleratedcure.org
20 mood247.com
Table 7.16: Examples of Negative Seeds
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Figure 7.2: RMSD Results
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Figure 7.3: Number of Integrated Seed Sets after Each Iteration
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No. Website
1 dhhs.gov
2 medlineplus.gov
3 pelvicpainnewyork.com
4 familydoctor.org
5 jdrfcapitol.org
6 medscape.com
7 smokefree.gov
8 helpingamericayouth.gov
9 healthcare411.org
10 ncpublichealth.com
11 unc.edu
12 clevelandclinic.org
13 texaspain.org
14 ivfspecialists.com
15 otcsafety.org
Table 7.17: HealthTrust Results: Top15
approaches. We conclude that our ISACA algorithm compromises well the link analysis and
content analysis
96
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Healthcare Informatics is a promising field to utilize the flood of healthcare related data
through adoption of information technologies. Currently, a large amount of data are pro-
duced in this field along with the web technologies such as social networking services, real-
time web technologies such as wikis, blogs, and RSS (Really Simple Syndication). However,
not all health information provided online is trustworthy. Even though many experts are
involved in publishing trusted information, people can hardly determine the credibility of the
information easily. Most search engines have the ability to control spam pages, but cannot
determine the trustworthiness of the page yet. Hence, identifying the credible information
on the complicated web society is a challenging problem.
8.1 Summary of Research
In this dissertation, I did a thorough study on a large volume of online healthcare information
collected by a focused crawler. With the focus on the providers of such information, I
have tried to answer questions such as who they are, how they are distributed, and how
they are related. I have measured the network structural features, analyzed the graph
topology, and studied the nodes and the links distributed over top level domains. I have used
link analysis approaches, PageRank, HITS, and TrustRank to study the authoritativeness
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of websites based on graph topology, and found that traditional approaches gave mixed
results of credible, suspicious, and irrelevant sites. With two user studies, I showed that
commercial search engine results for health-related queries were far from satisfactory; many
untrustworthy or highly suspicious sites were returned. Meanwhile it is not easy for users to
distinguish trustworthy sites from the mixed results. A reliable mechanism to automatically
determine the trustworthiness of online healthcare information is highly desired.
First of all, I proposed a new system named HealthTrust to provide the overall as-
sessment system which automatically assesses the trustworthiness of healthcare information
over the Internet. In HealthTrust system, “Structure-based Analysis” is performed in or-
der to use the link-structure of the web graph, which is a traditional method to assess
the rankings of the web pages. However, link analysis has its own drawback which is not
considering the trustworthiness of the contents. In order to overcome the limitations, we
need a method to start propagating the trustworthiness through the web graph. We used
“TwoWay-TrustRank” which takes into account the positive and negative factors. However,
structure-based analysis fundamentally has the limitations, since it only takes into account
the link structure rather than the content of the web pages.
Therefore, for next step, I developed “Content-based Analysis” which is based on topic
modeling and machine learning techniques. We followed two methods for analysis: (1) Topic
discovery : short-text tagging application called TAGME is used to identify salient topics in
the sentences available in the healthcare websites. An analysis of the similarity measures
among the topics identified is used to decide if the information from candidate website falls
under the suspicious or trustworthy category. (2) HMM analysis : Hidden Markov Models
are applied to model trustworthy and suspicious sentences using an annotated training set.
Finally, in order to integrate the two approaches, I used an iterative algorithm that inte-
grates the credibility assessments from structure-based and content-based methods. In the
iterations, strongly positive and strongly negative results from the structure-based approach
will be used as “additional seeds” in the content-based approach, and vise versa. The iter-
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ative approach further counteracts the problem of limited seeds as well as the sparseness of
the document space.
I believe that HealthTrust will improve the existing way of finding useful information
related to healthcare for hundreds of millions of the Internet users. However, the trend of
the Web has been rapidly changing to focus on Social Networks (SNs) environment such as
Facebook, Twitter. The consumers tend to heavily rely on the contents or comments of SNs
as well. In addition, the characteristics of the SNs are very different from other scientific,
authoritative websites. Therefore it needs more careful observations and approaches to assess
the trustworthiness of the SN information. We consider the SNs as a huge Web graph where
the users correspond to nodes, and hyperlinks or like correspond to links between nodes. The
comments or messages correspond to the text information. We can apply our HealthTrust
system to the SN graph to identify the most important factors that affect users.
8.2 Future Work
Despite the fact that the HealthTrust and existing methods trying to assess the trustworthi-
ness of the information related to healthcare, we are still far away from obtaining accurate
assessment due to the characteristics of the natural language and the lack of verifying sys-
tems of the healthcare information. Since it is controversial that the content of healthcare
websites is true or not, the reference sets are not always true. Moreover, I only explored
a small part of the web embracing certain topics in this dissertation. In fact, the Internet
itself is a tremendously huge graph and it is really difficult to cover the whole scale of it by a
focused crawler to get the expected coverage. There is still a great need for developing more
efficient algorithms to deal with the big web data and controversial contents problem.
Therefore, the problem description is, how we can accurately assess the contents. We
need to take into account the contents of web pages from all various websites than its link
structure. In computer science perspective, the problem is to include how to deal with the
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big-data efficiently. Nowadays, dealing with big-data becomes a hot topic due to rapidly
growing social networking sites as well as general web sites. Healthcare informatics is one of
the challenging problem.
For future studies, firstly, I would like to elaborate my content-based analysis by modeling
sophisticate algorithm. My goal is to assess the contents with accuracy and speed. As part
of my research, I would like to address how we can assess the contents of web pages in real
time without waiting for the results. Secondly, the integration algorithm should be improved
to identify more accurate trustworthy and suspicious groups
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[23] G. Eysenbach and C. Köhler. How do consumers search for and appraise health infor-
mation on the world wide web? qualitative study using focus groups, usability tests,
and in-depth interviews. Bmj, 324(7337):573–577, 2002.
[24] G. Eysenbach, J. Powell, O. Kuss, and E. Sa. Empirical studies assessing the quality of
health information for consumers on the world wide web. JAMA: The Journal of the
American Medical Association, 287(20):2691–2700, 2002.
[25] P. Ferragina and U. Scaiella. Tagme: on-the-fly annotation of short text fragments
(by wikipedia entities). In Proceedings of the 19th ACM international conference on
Information and knowledge management, pages 1625–1628. ACM, 2010.
[26] W. Francis and H. Kucera. Frequency analysis of english usage. 1982.
[27] B. Frey and D. Dueck. Clustering by passing messages between data points. science,
315(5814):972–976, 2007.
[28] C. Friedman, G. Hripcsak, et al. Natural language processing and its future in medicine.
Acad Med, 74(8):890–5, 1999.
103
[29] E. Gabrilovich and S. Markovitch. Computing semantic relatedness using wikipedia-
based explicit semantic analysis. In IJCAI, volume 7, pages 1606–1611, 2007.
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